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INTRODUCTION
This birthday celebration of the Federal Rules is a time to marvel
at the enduring character of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Given the dramatic changes that have taken place in litigation over
these decades, it is no surprise that the proponents of the philosophy of
uniform and trans-substantive rules believe that time has proved their
case. I want to suggest, however, as indeed others already have,1 that
trans-substantive rulemaking in fact has been eroded and replaced by
ad hoc versions of specialized rules. One clear example of such ad hoc
proceduralism comes via the increased number of judicial adjuncts, who
customize procedure for particular and individual cases. This example
supports those who call for a different approach to federal rulemaking.
The judicial adjuncts to whom I refer are primarily masters and
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Michigan. My special thanks to Professors Steve Burbank and Steve Sub-
rin for the many intense conversations on the subject of trans-substantive procedure. I
am also grateful to Dean John Sexton, Professors Oscar Chase, Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Samuel Estricher, Judith Resnik, Victor Goldberg, Richard Revesz, and Mr. Sol
Schreiber for their comments and suggestions on prior drafts. And my appreciation to
my former student, Barbara Quackenbos, now a graduate of New York University
School of Law and present clerk to Magistrate Kathleen Roberts, for her extensive
research, help and, as always, her unbounded enthusiasm and devotion to the project.
1 See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1941-42 (1989); cf. Subrin, Federal Rules,
Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2048 (1989) ("[N]on-trans-substantive procedure
is already here; some cases already have special predetermined procedural rules").
' For a critique of the informalism and discretion which has come to dominate the
conduct of litigation under the Federal Rules, see Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com-
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909, 922-25 (1987); see also Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme
Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988)
(noting trend in modern procedural law away from rules that make policy decisions
and toward rules that confer a substantial amount of normative discretion on trial
courts).
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magistrates.' There are also the newly created arbitrators in court-an-
nexed arbitration used in a number of districts, but that experience is
relatively new, and I bypass them for purposes of present discussion.'
There is no doubt that the use of judicial adjuncts has been extremely
valuable in processing our expanding and complicated contemporary
litigation caseload, and thus I intend my comments less as an attack on
the use of masters and magistrates than as an example of why more
dramatic procedural reform is in order. In short, I think delegations of
judicial power to masters and magistrates have become the substitute
for a more precise and specialized procedural code. To some extent
then, the debate can be seen as one between those who are satisfied
with an individual case-by-case customized procedure' put in place by
judicial adjuncts versus those who advocate more formal rules that do
not slavishly adhere to a uniform and trans-substantive format.6 These
divisions are also not as sharp as I first described them because I think
the development and customization of specialized procedures under the
present judicial adjunct models actually provide some of the building
blocks on which a more formal system of particularistic rules can be
erected.
Thus, the case study I present has a two-fold purpose. First, I
make the claim that a close examination of modern judicial adjuncts
exposes the myth that there is in fact a single set of "federal rules of
civil 'procedure," and I advocate establishing formal alternative proce-
I Masters and magistrates have been the primary source of adjunct judicial help
in the federal courts. See Weinstein & Weiner, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts:
Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 436-38 (1988); see also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the
Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779, 789-93 (1975) (summarizing the use of mas-
ters in federal courts during the first half of the twentieth century).
' The 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702 has provided for court-annexed arbitration in certain district courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 651-58 (1989). Prior experimentation had already taken place in these districts. See
McMillen & Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431, 432-38 (1985); Nejelski & Zeldin,
Court Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L.
REV. 787, 800-07 (1983). The premises of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are
discussed in Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427-31 (1986). Some concerns with ADR are
expressed in Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 376-89
(1986).
1 See Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2081-85 (1989); Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1901, 1923-24 (1989).
8 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1935-37; Subrin, supra note 1, at 2051.
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dural tracks for processing different types of cases.7 Second, and on a
less ambitious note, I believe that given the way special masters are
now being used, specific revisions in Rule 53 itself are necessary. Be-
cause both of these proposals have more to do with the use of special
masters than magistrates, my emphasis will be on the use of special
masters. But it is worth looking at both models for points of contrast.
I. CONTRASTING THE SYSTEMS OF MASTERS AND MAGISTRATES
The introduction of federal magistrates and the increasing use of
special masters is but one by-product of the dramatic changes in litiga-
tion since 1938. A variety of factors are responsible for this transforma-
tion of litigation: revisions in the 1938 Rules over the years,8 congres-
sional expansion of new federal rights,9 and a judicial acceptance of an
expanded role for courts and judges in the evolution of rights and reme-
dies.'0 To some degree, one would have expected a dramatic procedural
overhaul to cope with the amount and new breed of cases. Instead, the
existing system has been made functional by improvising with an ad-
junct judiciary, which does not have the status, tenure, and/or account-
ability of Article III judges."
At the outset, I want to distinguish the two main "systems" of
adjuncts - masters and magistrates. Federal magistrates, unlike special
masters, do have a formal and institutional role within the federal sys-
tem. They were introduced into the federal judicial system with the
passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968,12 replacing the com-
missioners (who had assisted in the preliminary stages of criminal
cases) and taking on additional duties in civil cases. Under the statute,
magistrates are salaried judicial officers, appointed for a term of years
with qualifications established for their selection. 13 Their duties are
' See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
8 Important revisions to the Federal Rules have been made over the past fifty
years. In 1966, for example, substantial amendments to the joinder and class action
rules were enacted. In 1970, a basic overhaul of the discovery rules took place, and in
1983, provisions for the imposition of sanctions were added to the pleading and discov-
ery rules.
9 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 80 (1985).
10 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1302-09 (1976); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes; What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious Sod-
ety, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 18-26 (1983).
11 Magistrates are appointed for an eight-year term pursuant to statutory proce-
dures. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. Special masters are appointed to
aid the judge in the handling of a particular case. See infra notes 15-16 and accompa-
nying text.
12 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-02, 3060 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-39 (1982).
11 The existing requirements are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1982). Magistrates
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spelled out in both the Magistrates Act and the Federal Rules.'
In contrast, special masters are private lawyers, retired judges, or
legal academics who are appointed to assist the judge in the handling of
a particular case. 5 No standards exist for their appointment, other
than the requirement of an "exceptional condition" that appears in
Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The history of
special masters is a much longer one, going back to early English chan-
cery practice, continuing in federal equity practice, and introduced into
the Federal Rules in 1938.1" Historically, special masters were used
primarily to assist judges during trial in matters of account and often to
report on matters of evidence.'" In early federal practice before 1938
special masters participated in virtually all aspects of the case,'" includ-
ing those aspects that occurred prior to trial, but Professor (now Mag-
istrate) Wayne Brazil argues that the 1938 adoption of Federal Rule
53, which expressly authorized the use of special masters, did not in-
clude a pre-trial role for special masters.20 In addition, while the Clark
Papers did indicate that the original advisory committee intended to
continue "the long tradition in equity of using special masters to per-
are appointed by the concurrence of a majority of the judges of the relevant district,
subject to the standards and procedures promulgated by the Judicial Conference, for a
term of eight years. See id. at § 631 (a), (b)(5), and (e). Their salaries are fixed by the
Judicial Conference, up to an annual rate equal to 92% of a district judge's salary. See
28 U.S.C. § 634(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); FED. R. Civ. P. 72-76.
" See Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 454-55 (1958); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Ana-
logue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1320 (1975).
16 Federal Rule 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In
actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in mat-
ters of account and of difficult compensation of damages, a reference shall
be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
Upon the consent of the parties, a magistrate may be designated to serve
as a special master without regard to the provisions of this subdivision.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
17 The development of Rule 53 by the original advisory committee is discussed in
Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 A Source of Author-
ity and Restrictions?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 143 [hereinafter Brazil, Referring
Discovery Tasks], revised and reprinted in Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks
to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing Sources and the Need for a New Federal
Rule, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF
SPECIAL MASTERS 305 (W. Brazil, G. Hazard & P. Rice eds. 1983) [hereinafter
MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION].
18 See id. at 149-51.
19 See id.
20 Professor Brazil argues that Rule 53 is aimed only at trial-stage functions and
that the early drafts of the 1938 discovery rules indicated an intention by the original
advisory committee to dispense with "discovery masters." Id. at 160-72.
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form tasks after a court had determined liability," 2 1 the wide-ranging
role that remedial masters now have22 is unlike their historic function.
Indeed, existing Federal Rule 53, which provides for the appointment
of special masters on a showing of exceptional conditions and envisions
a report by the master subject to a "clearly erroneous" factual review
by the district judge, does not quite fit the circumstances in which spe-
cial masters are used today.23
Notwithstanding the compelling historical evidence that a more
limited role was intended, masters have consistently been used under
Rule 53 to assist in trial, pre-trial, and post-trial phases of litigation. 2
Masters are usually private attorneys, retired judges, or legal academ-
ics, appointed by a judge under an order of reference in an individual
case to assist the judge in the handling of a case when warranted by an
"exceptional condition."' 25 Concerns over the delay and expense often
associated with the use of special masters and a fear that such refer-
ences amounted to an abdication of the judicial function led the Su-
preme Court in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.26 to limit the circum-
stances under which a special master could be appointed. It should be
noted that the reference in La Buy-for what was then a large and
complicated antitrust action-to a "special master" (a practicing attor-
ney as was the prevailing custom) was a general reference for the
master to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and, in essence,
to take over the adjudicatory task of the judge.2
The modern uses of special masters are often quite different from
the very general reference invoked in La Buy. To some extent, special
masters' functions are often more sharply focused: to supervise various
pre-trial phases of litigation (particularly in the large or complicated
case), to facilitate settlement under a broad charter to act as a negotia-
tor and conciliator between the parties, or to assist in shaping, monitor-
2 Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in
Federal Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 753, 757
(1984).
22 See infra notes 147-80 and accompanying text.
2 For example, the report procedure with its concomitant "clearly erroneous"
factual review does not make much sense when the master superintends discovery.
Moreover, on dispositive motions magistrates make "recommendations" subject to de
novo review; certainly special masters should not be given greater deference on similar
references.
2 The pre-trial role of special masters is discussed in Kaufman, supra note 15, at
468-69; Silberman, supra note 15, at 1338-46.
2 See supra note 16 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)).
26 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
2 The reference provided that the special master should attend the six-week trial
in order to "'take evidence and to report ... to this Court, together with his findings of
fact and conclusions of law.'" Id. at 253 (quoting the reference).
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ing, or enforcing compliance with post-judgment relief.2" It should be
noted that the "exceptional condition" requirement is applicable to all
references to masters in non-jury cases (other than magistrates),29 ex-
cept in matters of account and damage calculation, 0 but this lesson of
La Buy seems to be honored more in the breach than in the observance
in the recent cases in which special masters have been appointed.3
Masters and magistrates have taken on burdensome discovery
tasks, orchestrated settlements, and issued rulings on preliminary is-
sues. Although both have relieved the inordinate pressures on judges'
time, there are practical objections to the delegations of these tasks.
Discovery disputes and other pre-trial matters are now outside of direct
control by the judge. The broad discretion inherent in the system of
discovery rules is exercised by persons once-removed from the judge.
This trend itself is inconsistent with the recent emphasis on strong and
28 For a more extensive discussion of the various functions, see infra notes 61-146
and accompanying text.
29 When a magistrate serves as a special master with consent of the parties, no
exceptional condition is required. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982); FED R. Civ. P.
53(b). References to magistrates - when not expressly made as a special master under
Rule 53 - are not subject to Rule 53 at all. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(0.
10 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2605
(1971). However, such references are proper only if the accounting or calculation is
difficult. See id.; see also infra note 189 and accompanying text. It also should be noted
that in jury cases the standard for referring a case to a master is "only when the issues
are complicated . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b); see, e.g., United States v. Horton, 622
F.2d 144, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1980) (Medicare provider reimbursement case complicated
enough to warrant special master).
" A review of cases reveals a substantial number of references to special masters
for discovery in "unexceptional" cases. See, e.g., Celpaco, Inc. v. MD Papierfabriken,
686 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1988) (master appointed to oversee discovery in RICO
litigation); Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 83 C
3150, (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 1988) (insurance dispute); Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp.
1466, 1495-96 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (special master appointed to monitor discovery in liti-
gation of RICO and securities violations); National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v.
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 560-61 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (master appointed to monitor de-
fendant's compliance with its own internal plan for meeting discovery requests); L.
Knife & Son, Inc. v. Bonfi Prods. Corp., 118 F.R.D. 269, 270 (D. Mass. 1987) (spe-
cial master appointed to recommend rulings in discovery proceedings for dispute be-
tween wine supplier and wine distributor over unfair trade practices); Price v. Viking
Press, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 585, 586 (D. Minn. 1986) (master used to oversee discovery in
defamation case). It is unclear whether judges believed these pre-trial references to be
warranted under Rule 53 or whether they were relying on their "inherent authority."
Notwithstanding the extensive use being made of special masters at the pre-trial stage,
Professor Brazil has persuasively made the case that Rule 53 did not contemplate a
pre-trial role for masters under the Rule, in Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks, supra
note 17, at 160-72. Some courts, of course, exercise self-restraint and refuse to appoint
a special master, despite a party's motion. See Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83-8958
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1986) (landlord/tenant case; judge denied motion on grounds that
calendar considerations, complexity of issues, and possibility of long trial not "excep-
tional" condition under Rule 53).
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close judicial management because the magistrate and not the judge has
control of the case. The delegation of case management functions itself
may create an incentive for expansion of the pre-trial phase of litiga-
tion, and an additional danger comes with layering the pre-trial phases
with magistrates' and masters' decisions requiring further review by the
district judge.
To the extent that cases are shaped, ad hoc procedures embraced,
settlements influenced and even coerced, and law articulated, special
masters may represent an even greater threat to the integrity of the
process because they are private individuals who are not institutionally
entrusted with judicial powers. The danger of a new cottage industry,
enhanced by large fees for special masters and endangered by potential
cronyism and conflicts of interest, cannot be ignored when assessing the
system of special masters presently in vogue. 2
In raising these objections to the adjunct judiciary that ,has devel-
oped, I do not overlook the tremendous demands of modern-day case
management. But I do believe that the ability to delegate many judicial
tasks to judicial adjuncts partly explains why we have failed to under-
take more comprehensive procedural reform. I want to tell the larger
story of magistrates and special masters in order to help rethink a more
particularistic formal procedure for many kinds of cases-cases that are
presently given ad hoc and improvised treatment by judicial adjuncts.
II. FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AS JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS
The introduction of federal magistrates into the judicial system
was a conscious effort to relieve district judges of their substantial pre-
trial burden in civil cases, leaving judges free to devote more time to the
central task of adjudication-hearing cases and writing opinions.3" Fur-
thermore, the addition of a full-time judicial officer to handle pre-trial
aspects of the litigation was thought preferable to the delegation of
those duties to part-time special masters, occasionally appointed to as-
sume such tasks.34 Therefore, in 1968, magistrates replaced the former
commissioners (who assisted in the preliminary stages of criminal
cases)35 and in addition assumed a central role in handling pre-trial
32 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
" The magistrate's role in civil cases under the 1970 Act is described in Silber-
man, supra note 15, at 1321-50; see also Federal Magistrates Act: Hearings on S.
3475, S. 945 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., and 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 34-
37 (1966-67).
3" See Spaniol, The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 568.
:1 See Peterson, Federal Magistrates Act: A New Dimension in the Implementa-
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matters in civil litigation." The original Act provided that these full-
time judicial officials could be assigned, when so authorized by a major-
ity of the district judges, "such additional duties as are not inconris-ent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States."13 7 ' The original
statute, with language designed not to restrict potential uses of magis-
trates, referred expressly to the tasks of (1) traditional special masters,
(2) pre-trial and discovery assistance, and (3) recommendations on
whether to hold post-conviction relief hearings."' Following some con-
fusion about the extent of magistrates' duties under these rather vague
guidelines and conflicting authority concerning the standard of review
by judges of magistrate rulings, 9 the Magistrates Act was amended in
1976 and again in 1979 to spell out more precisely the powers of mag-
istrates. Under these provisions, non-dispositive pre-trial matters may
be determined by the magistrate subject to traditional review by the
district court;40 other dispositive-type matters, such as summary judg-
ment, judgment on the pleadings, and motions to dismiss or to maintain
a class action may be heard by a magistrate whose "recommendation"
will be subject to "de novo determination" by the district court.4 ' In
addition, magistrates may, with consent of the parties, conduct jury and
non-jury trials.42
tion of Justice, 56 IOWA L. REv. 62, 66-67 (1970).
3 See supra note 33.
3 Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108, 1113 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) (1982)).
38 See id. at § 636(b)(1)-(3). "Additional duties" held to be appropriate under the
original statute included review of the administrative record in Social Security benefit
cases. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
" See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 520 F.2d 499, 503-04 (1st
Cir. 1975) (presenting question of whether magistrate may preside at trial with the
consent of the parties), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen,
460 F.2d 348, 359 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that case-dispositive matters could not be
referred to a magistrate); see also Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates: Hearing
on S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1975) (report of William Hastie,
Chairman) (magistrates "are the final judges in many instances, and hold in [their]
hands broad and sweeping powers"); S. REP. No. 625, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976)
(magistrate has authority to make final determination of pre-trial issues subject to re-
view by the court under the "clearly erroneous standard").
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982). The power of magistrates to hear and
make recommendations on dispositive motions, subject to de novo review was upheld in
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (criminal suppression hearing).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
42 See id. at § 636(c)(1). The courts have consistently upheld this power as within
constitutional bounds. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 924-30
(3rd Cir. 1983); Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984); Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Broth-
ers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1984)
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With the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, specific rules implementing the provisions of the Magistrates Act
were introduced."' The statute had contemplated and relied on local
rules as the means of offering and implementing flexibility in the use of
magistrates within individual district courts. As magistrates assumed a
substantial presence within the system, it made pragmatic sense to in-
clude within the Federal Rules themselves the statutory reference pro-
cedures for using magistrates.
The Magistrates Act, the Federal Rules, and individual local rules
combine to permit judges to use magistrates to ease their caseloads with
an eye to the particularized needs of an individual judge and the cir-
cumstances of a given case. As Professor Carroll Seron reports in her
Nine Case Studies, the use of magistrates varies substantially from dis-
trict to district-often depending upon the caseload demands of the par-
ticular district and the district's organizational philosophy about the re-
lationship between judge and magistrate."'
Although questions still arise over the propriety of particular ref-
erences,4 5 the statutory scope of magistrates' civil jurisdiction is gener-
ally clear. They may hold pre-trial conferences (including the initial
120 day conference required under Rule 16(b) when authorized by lo-
cal rule);46 they may be given a general reference to supervise discovery
and hear and determine disputed matters that arise in the course of
discovery, or they may take a reference to rule on a specific discovery
dispute;47 they may hear and make recommendations on other types of
matters, including dispositive pre-trial motions such as summary judg-
(en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of
America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 542-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984). However, strong dissents regarding the constitutional power have
been registered. See, e.g., Geras, 742 F.2d at 1045-54 (Posner, J., dissenting); Lehman
Brothers, 739 F.2d at 1319-20 (Arnold, Lay, and Bowman, JJ., dissenting). The Su-
preme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 458
U.S. 50, 87 (1982), striking down legislation granting bankruptcy judges broad Article
III judicial power, is not inconsistent with permitting magistrates to conduct trials since
such references must be with the consent of the parties.
"I See FED. R. Civ. P. 72-76. The author served as Assistant Reporter to the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when these Rules were added.
"" Professor Seron examined the activities of magistrates in nine districts. See C.
SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 1 (1985) [hereinafter
NINE CASE STUDIES]; see also C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 71 (1983) [hereinafter ROLES OF MAGISTRATES].
"' The most recent conflict-whether magistrates may preside over jury selection in
a federal trial-was decided by the Supreme Court this past term. See Gomez v. United
States, 109 S.Ct. 2237 (1989) (holding that the Magistrates Act does not authorize a
magistrate to preside over jury selection).
46 See FED. R. CIv. P. 16 & advisory committee note.
4 See ROLES OF MAGISTRATES, supra note 44, at 16-20; see also 28 U.S.C. §636
(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
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ment;4 8 they may be used to assist in settlement aspects of the case; and
they even may, with the consent of the parties, preside at trials.49
Professor Seron's empirical work offers a more realistic sense as to
how magistrates are actually functioning in civil cases. 50 In a number
of districts, magistrates are hearing substantial numbers of post-convic-
tion relief and social security cases, in which the magistrate makes only
a "recommendation," to be accepted or rejected by the district judge.
Although critics often object that such references amount to a kind of
"second-class justice" for these parties,"' the caseload proportions of the
federal docket indicate that jurisdictional reshuffling of some type will
be necessary. When weighed against other alternatives, such as more
dramatic limitations on access to the federal courts or the creation of
specialized courts for some of these cases, the magistrate referral option
with de novo review by the district judge remains attractive.
The area in which magistrates seem to have the highest degree of
civil case participation is at the discovery stage, where magistrates not
only superintend pre-trial, but also "hear and determine" non-disposi-
tive motions.5 2 This trend is not unexpected. The Magistrate's Act was
intended to provide relief for trial judges to insure that judges are free
to perform their crucial adjudicatory duties without undue distraction.
Moreover, the practice of providing for magistrate control over discov-
ery is part of the larger judicial trend toward a case-management phi-
losophy and more tightly controlled pre-trial handling of civil cases.
That magistrates have an important pre-trial discovery role is in-
evitable; what price the judicial system pays for that is less clear. One
advantage that magistrates have (at least when compared to other ad-
junct alternatives, whether they be special masters, arbitrators, or
mediators) is their institutional accountability. Magistrates are salaried
judicial officers; proceedings before them and assignments to them are
within a structure of formal rules. Qualifications for their appoint-
ments are mandated. Relationships between judges and magistrates, al-
though not uniform across districts, are well-developed.
As a long-time advocate of the magistrate system,53 I recognize the
important and valuable role magistrates have in processing the heavy
'1 See ROLES OF MAGISTRATES, supra note 44, at 16-20; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 (b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
" See ROLES OF MAGISTRATES, supra note 44, at 16-20; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 (c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
50 See NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 44, at 5-14.
5' Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 438 n.243 (1982).
52 See NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 44, at 69-82.
53 See Silberman, supra note 15, at 1372; Silberman, Masters and Magistrates
Part I: The English Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070, 1106-08 (1975).
[Vol. 137:2131
JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS REVISITED
civil litigation caseload. I merely raise a two-fold concern that comes
with substantial reliance on judicial adjuncts. First, an uncensored, al-
most reflexive response to refer all pre-trial discovery to magistrates is
developing. As a result, there may be a hydraulic effect on discovery,
now that there is an "institutionalized setting" in which discovery dis-
putes may flourish. Litigants are somewhat insulated from the judge,
and to some degree the recent emphasis on strong and close judicial
management is undercut because the magistrate and not the judge has
control of the case. 54 The conclusion that magistrates are another cata-
lyst for increased discovery is mere speculation, but the thought is
worth consideration. Second, the institutional response-to take bur-
densome discovery away from judges and place it elsewhere in the sys-
tem-may have relieved some of the pressure on the rulemakers to re-
assess the discovery rules more generally. Ad hoc attention to and
discretionary-based treatment for different kinds of cases-in the form
of magistrate supervision-continue to give sustenance to the myth that
we operate in a system of trans-substantive procedure. Systematized,
formal rules for particular kinds of cases may be an alternative that the
creation of the magistrate system has allowed us to forsake.
III. SPECIAL MASTERS
Whatever objections one might have to the bureaucratization and
proliferation of adjuncts that has come with the system of magistrates,
those developments pale when measured by the recent and expanding
phenomenon of delegations of authority to special masters. 55 It is ironic
84 The recent emphasis on judicial management has been criticized as taking
judges away from their core mission of adjudication. For an analysis and critique of
managerial judging, see Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. CH. L. REv. 306, 328-34 (1986); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Proce-
dure in Decline, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 494, 534-39 (1986); Resnik, supra note 51, at
424-31. Not surprisingly, the judges themselves are more sanguine about the need to
serve as "case manager." See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The
New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770-
73 (1981); Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDI-
CATURE 400, 402-06 (1978).
55 Some of the objections to special masters-whether they serve as pre-trial as-
sistants or in the broader role of fact-finders in complex litigation-are not necessarily
applicable to magistrates. Magistrates, unlike masters, are salaried judicial officers with
specified duties delineated by statute and local rules. Procedures for review of magis-
trate determinations and recommendations are defined, and the scope of judicial review
is also provided. Neither the outside commitments of ad hoc special masters or the delay
and expense characteristically associated with the schedules of private "masters" bur-
den the magistrate system. Moreover, the appointment of magistrates is part of an insti-
tutional process. Indeed, for these reasons, the Magistrates Act permits the appointment
of a magistrate as a special master, when the parties consent, without requiring that the
ordinary requirement of an exceptional condition in Rule 53 be met. References to
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that the special master role, particularly in the pre-trial phase of litiga-
tion, appears to have been expanded rather than reduced by the ap-
pearance of federal magistrates. 56 A survey and reading of reported
cases reveals an increasing use of special masters in a variety of
contexts.
For the moment, I want to bypass the oldest and least controver-
sial role of special masters in matters of accounting, the calculation of
damages,5 7 and other ministerial roles in the administration and distri-
bution of settlement or judgment funds.58 There have been two broader
interventionist roles for special masters that have emerged relatively re-
cently: one is a case evaluation and case management function, which
includes supervision of discovery, the resolution of discovery disputes
and other pre-trial matters, and settlement; 59 the second is a post-relief
role in helping the court implement and effectuate equitable decrees
involving complicated institutional relationships.60 Neither of the roles
magistrates generally are not within Rule 53 unless so specified.
"' There was some thought that the availability of magistrates might alleviate the
need for special masters. However, the example of the para-judge or assistant judge in
the character of magistrate in fact may have glamorized the role of "assistant to the
judge."
"' For discussion of using special masters for matters of account and for comput-
ing damages, see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 306 (1920) (appointment of an
auditor in an action at law). For a more modern example of a special master serving in
this capacity, see Brock v. Ing, 827 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1987).
" For a thorough discussion of the role of special masters in case evaluation and
case management, see Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judici-
ary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 397 (1986) [hereinafter
Brazil, Complex Cases] (noting the pressure on judges to take a more activist role in
managing litigation, and the related consequences of increased responsibility for special
masters); see also Brazil, Special Masters in the Pre-trial Development of Big Cases:
Potential and Problems, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 289, 294-317 (discussing the
use of special masters in the pre-trial phase). For more specific case studies of how
special masters function, see Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the Pre-trial
Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. R.s. J. 375, 381-414 (1982); McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for
Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 440, 456-91 (1986) (describing his
role as master managing the pre-trial phase in several large cases); see also Kaufman,
TheJudicial Crisis: Court Delay and the Parajudge, 54 JUDICArURE 145, 148 (1970)
(encouraging the use of para-professionals to meet the increasing amount of litigation);
Kaufman, supra note 15, at 466 (study of three complex cases demonstrated that ap-
pointment of special masters resulted in "an overwhelming savings of the court's time
and labor").
"0 For an excellent overview, see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Insti-
tutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 805-09, 827-28 (1978); see also
Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 491 (1980) (arguing that detailed supervision of institutional
litigation is a response to complexity and intransigence); Weinberg, The Judicial Ad-
junct and Public Law, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 367, 368 (1983) (examining the role
and effect of judicial adjuncts).
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is characteristic of the special master envisioned by the 1938 Federal
Rules.
A. Pre-Trial
The special master's pre-trial role is most relevant to our purposes
in assessing the impact on what I sense is the retreat to an equity-based
system of procedure, the failure to address troublesome procedural is-
sues with more formalized rule-making, and the absence of specialized
procedures for specialized cases. I say that notwithstanding the irony
that it is precisely such "procedural specialization" that is brought to
bear in cases in which special masters are used to supervise discovery.e
But the technique is ad hoc, informal, discretionary and expensive.
A prime example of case management and sui generis procedural
innovation is the Ohio asbestos litigation which involved two special
masters, Professors Francis McGovern and Eric Green. In 1983, with
80 pending asbestos cases in the Northern District of Ohio (and 34
more on the way) assigned to different judges, some having been filed
years earlier, Judge Lambros appointed the two special masters to
oversee pre-trial and help prepare for a possible trial of these many
claims.62 One early pre-trial activity undertaken by McGovern and
Green involved the gathering of information from the parties about past
trial outcomes and settlement amounts with a dual purpose of prepar-
ing for trial and establishing settlement parameters.63 After interview-
ing the parties, the masters set up a limited discovery schedule which
would enable each case to be developed sufficiently for a realistic evalu-
ation. Then the parties were brought together to discuss possible settle-
ment. If the initial settlement conference did not yield the desired reso-
lution, the parties could then bear the expense of further discovery
which might have greater relevance with respect to a projected trial.64
In addition to equalizing the information available to the parties
and promoting settlement before expensive discovery, the masters also
61 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62 The Ohio asbestos litigation is discussed at length in both Brazil, Complex
Cases, supra note 59, at 398-402, and McGovern, supra note 59, at 478-91.
63 Various of the defendants had kept their settlement offers secret from other
defendants, with the result that the plaintiffs alone could assess the settlement value of
many claims. According to McGovern, the defendants cared less about the absolute
amount of money they spent and were concerned more about the amount relative to
what other defendants paid out. The means of promoting future settlements, therefore,
was to educate the defendants about each others' settlements. See McGovern, supra
note 59, at 480.
64 See id. at 484.
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sought to group the cases into sub-categories which would conceivably
lead to rapid disposition of most or all of the cases.8 5 This "cluster" of
a representative sample from each "disease category" would proceed
through discovery, settlement negotiation, and trial in an effort to in-
duce settlement.66 According to McGovern, the sample contained both
weak and strong cases for each side in an effort to convince each side of
the possible flaws in its own case, and the strength of the other's.6 7
Another sui generis procedural innovation adopted by the special
masters necessitated the involvement of others besides the masters.
"Neutral" individuals who had been trained for their data collection
role completed for each plaintiff an extremely detailed protocol which
then was computerized. 68 This information was supplemented by a
computerized memory, in essence, of what asbestos cases had fetched in
settlement, at trial, and in summary jury trials. The costs for special
masters, experts, computers, and incidental design of the innovative
program ran to over $250,000.9 The system, by now a small bureau-
cracy, became even more elaborate. The computers were programmed
with theories of econometrics and "dynamic" decision making to in-
clude legal, economic, political, and psychological permutations that
could influence the process of negotiation and accord.70 Finally, as he
had done in other cases, McGovern authored an "expert system" to
mimic the decision-making process.'
In sum, special masters McGovern and Green performed their as-
signed task-customizing a system to process asbestos claims promoting
settlement while minimizing substantive unfairness to any of the par-
ties-with insight and imagination. Yet, like Professor Brazil, I am un-
easy about the development of such an elaborate and makeshift proce-
dure given the sobering outlay of resources. As Brazil points out, there
is a nagging worry that reasonably accurate evaluations of a plaintiff's
case could have been produced without resorting to a complex and spe-
cially-produced apparatus. 72 Again, this is not meant as harshly as it
'5 See id. at 480.
66 See id. at 484.
87 See id. While ingenious in some respects, McGovern's streamlining of the pre-
trial phase also raises some concern about the specter of parties feeling coerced into
settling.
68 See id. at 487.
69 See id. at 489. McGovern notes that a grant from the National Institute for
Dispute Resolution helped defray some of the cost to the parties. See id.
70 See id. at 488.
71 See id. In the same article, McGovern describes his design of "a scorable game
that would mimic the actual dispute" in the United States v. Michigan litigation, aris-
ing from a current dispute of an 1836 treaty between the United States and the Ottawa
and Chippewa tribes. Id. at 461.
72 See Brazil, Complex Cases, supra note 59, at 402.
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might sound. The number of plaintiffs in the Ohio court may have
made traditional methods of case valuation impracticable and too time-
consuming. But if such customized tailoring-or something like it-is
desirable, perhaps there is an accumulated wisdom to be applied gener-
ically to other asbestos cases. Alternatively, perhaps the costs of such
customized tailoring outweigh the benefits.
In a comparable elaborate undertaking, Professors Hazard and
Rice were appointed special masters in the huge AT&T antitrust liti-
gation.73 For over three and a half years they supervised various aspects
of this massive litigation initiated by the government to divest AT&T, a
$100 billion-a-year corporation, of at least some of its operating compa-
nies. The case management task was overwhelming: tens of millions of
pages of documents, thousands of privilege requests, and more than two
hundred depositions.
7 4
Initially, their mandate was "to adjudicate claims of privilege," in
their words.7 5 To reduce the number of documents for which privilege
might be claimed, the judge allowed the producing party to mark a
document "Protected," so as to confine the contents to the litigation.
76
For documents for which this protection was insufficient, the masters
developed a series of guidelines purporting to set forth existing law and
under which privilege claims would be resolved. This clarification had
a self-censoring effect on the parties, who were reluctant to jeopardize
their standing with the masters with frivolous claims of privilege.7 A
further requirement put a burden of written factual support on the
party claiming privilege. In addition, the parties had to file indexes
every few weeks, summarizing the documents for which a privilege
claim was anticipated. A revised index, often containing many fewer
claims of privilege, was due several weeks after production. Conse-
quently, parties were much more likely to claim privilege only when
they had a solid basis for doing so.
Using this streamlined procedure, Hazard and Rice were able to
rule on over 4,000 claims referring to over 3,500 documents in roughly
71 See Hazard & Rice, supra note 59, at 384. Hazard and Rice were appointed as
special masters in May of 1978, three and a half years after the case was filed.
74 See id. at 382.
71 Id. at 384.
7 Judge Greene, who replaced Judge Waddy early on in the litigation, issued the
protective orders. See id. at 398.
7 See id. at 397-405 (describing in detail this system for assessing claims of privi-
lege); see also Rice, Judicial Management of Complex Litigation: Further Comments
on the Use of Informal Management Techniques and on Procedures for the Resolution
of Privilege Claims, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 296-98
(defending the process used to assess privilege claims in the AT&T litigation).
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a year.7" Robert McLean, one of the counsel involved, properly points
out two main reservations to the privilege procedures devised by Haz-
ard and Rice: it may not be necessary to "reinvent the wheel concern-
ing the law of privilege" in every mass litigation, 7  and such an elabo-
rate procedure may be gratuitous in a case where there is less resting
on the outcome of the privilege claim, whether it is mass litigation or a
more typical case.80
Because their responsibility increased to include primary pre-trial
management responsibility formerly vested with a magistrate, Hazard
and Rice quickly discovered the serious weaknesses in ordinary discov-
ery rules when applied to extraordinary litigation. For one thing, the
timetable under the rules is simply too drawn out in a case like AT&T
where years of discovery is virtually inevitable even under the best of
circumstances. In an effort to expedite the discovery process, the mas-
ters required the parties to file a copy of all requested discovery with
them. They were to receive any objection by the other side within ten
days. A hearing would take place within seven days. The masters
would tell the parties what issues to brief. The masters then typically
had a decision within three days of the submission of briefs. Thus, from
start to finish, a discovery dispute began, ran its course, and ended
within about thirty days.
This unusual pace is not contemplated by the existing discovery
rules, but illustrates one of the clearest advantages a special master of-
fers. Similar time advantages also accrued by having the masters attend
depositions which promised to be particularly contentious. On other
depositions, the masters were available for phone consultations and
often prevented drawn-out disputes.8 '
Hazard and Rice attempted to limit the open-ended pleadings
which are virtually useless in complex litigation like AT&T. They re-
quired the parties periodically to file Statements of Contentions and
Proof, which mapped out both factual assertions and the evidence to be
used at trial to support them. 2
In general, the masters set the tone and timetable for the litigation,
and helped the parties define issues. They met frequently and infor-
mally with the parties, both in an effort to keep the momentum going
78 See Hazard & Rice, supra note 59, at 404.
71 McLean, Pretrial Management in Complex Litigation: The Use of Special
Masters in United States v. AT&T, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note
17, at 284.
80 See id. at 286.
81 See Hazard & Rice, supra note 59, at 391; McLean, supra note 79, at 276-77.
82 The procedure of using Statements of Contention and Proof is described in
Hazard & Rice, supra note 59, at 405-10, and in McLean, supra note 79, at 286-88.
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as well as to make decisions expeditiously. 3 They were not oblivious to
the potential unfairness to the parties, however, and were careful to
encourage the parties to seek formal hearings if they so desired.84 The
masters believed that the "threat" of either party resorting to a formal
hearing increased the effectiveness of the informal procedure.85 Counsel
in the case, while realizing the value of operating by consensus, were
less sanguine than the masters: "This ex parte contact by the parties
with the special masters, however, while never actually abused by ei-
ther side, had clear potential for abuse and left each side with a vague
anxiety that something of consequence might be going on behind its
back. '" 86 For similar reasons, counsel worried about the ex parte com-
munications and in camera reports to the judge by the special masters,
and were concerned that their position might not be represented exactly
as they would have wished.87 While all of the cases (the final tally was
112) settled within less than two and a half years, the institutional
questions still linger. As McGovern himself candidly notes, "[I]f the
managerial horse is indeed out of the barn, we need a theory for man-
aging the horsepower." ' s
The Agent Orange litigation was another important "special
master" case-indeed, a number of special masters ultimately were
used in the case., doing everything from general discovery to settle-
ment. 9 If a case ever cried out for exceptional treatment, Agent Orange
was it. The proportions of the case were staggering: 600 consolidated
83 See McLean, supra note 79, at 286.
84 See Hazard & Rice, supra note 59, at 395. According to Hazard and Rice,
parties agreed to resolve "about 80 to 85 percent of the factual contentions" informally.
Id. at 413. Somewhat ironically, the negotiation process lasted several months longer
than the trial. (The case settled in the eleventh month of the trial, but had been widely
expected to end in another month.)
85 See id. at 394-95.
88 McLean, supra note 79, at 278.
17 See id.
88 McGovern, supra note 59, at 491. Another, and ill-advised, delegation to spe-
cial masters Hazard and Rice was the initial adjudication of evidentiary issues under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c), the so-called Business Records exception to the
hearsay rule. The parties appealed "most of the special masters' hundreds of rulings on
contested evidentiary questions." McLean, supra note 79, at 282. As Professor Rice
himself observes about special masters, "when their authority is extended beyond those
matters to trial-dominated issues and to legal questions of an outcome-determinative
nature, the delegation will probably not be justified because the decisions of the special
masters often amount to little more than costly advisory opinion." Rice, supra note 77,
at 296.
8 No fewer than eight special masters were utilized in Agent Orange. The latest
function to be assumed by a special master was announced by Judge Weinstein in In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(appointing a special master to hear "Appeals from denials of Payment Program
benefits").
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actions, over 15,000 named individuals, representing another 2.4 mil-
lion veterans and family members.9 ° The action took up a docket sheet
425 pages long, and the veterans were asking for between four and
forty billion dollars in damages against the chemical companies. 9 The
chemical companies in turn sought to join the United States as a third
party defendant, hoping either to get indemnity from the United States
or to urge their own immunity via a "government contract" defense.92
Judge George Pratt, the original district judge in the case, appointed
Sol Schreiber as special master to act as the court's agent in supervising
all discovery, assisting in any settlement negotiations, and preparing the
pre-trial order that would govern the Phase I trial on the issue of the
government contract defense."' Professor Peter Schuck, in his book
Agent Orange on Trial, explains some of the advantages of the special
master in this litigation for the parties:
[Flor the parties, he offered a means to obtain swift decisions
on discovery and related issues from someone with detailed
knowledge of the case that was unavailable to a busy, gener-
alist judge. Although the parties could always appeal the
special master's decisions to the judge, they knew that fre-
quent appeals would arouse resentment and probably be
fruitless. The special master could insulate the court from
messy, time-consuming details, distancing it from the law-
yers' incessant posturings and wrangling. The master also
constituted a new tactical resource with which the court
could hope to manipulate the parties toward agreement.94
Not only were there structural advantages in the use of a special
master to supervise discovery in Agent Orange, but Sol Schreiber had
unique capabilities. As a former federal magistrate, Schreiber had ex-
tensive judicial experience in fashioning practical and imaginative solu-
tions to discovery problems. For example, Schreiber persuaded the gov-
ernment to provide him with a security clearance to examine
government documents that might prove relevant; once Schreiber had
narrowed the pool, the government lawyers then could assert their
state-secret privilege, which requires an affidavit signed by the govern-
90 See P. SCHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 4 (1986). The veterans came mainly from the United States, but they also
came from New Zealand and Australia. See id. at 4-5.
91 See id. at 5.
9' See id. at 60-61.
13 See id. at 82-85, 92-98 (describing Schreiber's significant role).
Id. at 82-83. Judge Pratt confirmed all but one of Schreiber's decisions. That
one was modified. See id. at 83.
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ment department head. By relieving Cabinet officers from personally
reviewing thousands of documents, this customized procedure was an
invaluable aid to a potential discovery nightmare. 5
Schreiber also proposed a Solomonic solution early in the litigation
which would have moved the case forward and given something to each
of the parties. He suggested that the defendants agree to certification of
the plaintiff class under Rule 23(b)(3) and payment of any notice that
was ordered in return for plaintiffs' agreement to allow the defendants
to pursue, unopposed, the government contract defense in a bench trial.
Although the parties came close to entering a stipulation to this effect,
they ultimately did not agree on Schreiber's compromise.9 If they had
accepted it, questions might have been raised as to whether this avenue
of resolution-having parties abandon procedural protections to which
they have a right-is appropriate. Perhaps a case with these dimen-
sions is necessarily sui generis, but the impact of these suggested de-
tours around clear procedural precedent is worth pondering. It could
well be that a case like Agent Orange mandates these kinds of ex-
traordinary and innovative procedures. But if such a case is judicially
manageable at all, more formalized rules should be in place to govern
it. And if adjudication is really not feasible, alternatives will never be
developed in an atmosphere where ad hoc proceduralism reigns and
outcome, not process, is the only consideration.
Schreiber did not remain as the special master in the Agent Or-
ange litigation. Following Judge Pratt's appointment to the Second
Circuit, the case was transferred to Judge Weinstein, perhaps the most
experimental proceduralist of all district judges.97 Judge Weinstein ap-
pointed Magistrate Shira Scheindlin to perform the discovery coordina-
tion functions that previously had been performed by Schreiber." But
Judge Weinstein's substitution of a magistrate for a master did not im-
ply skepticism about the use of outside judicial adjuncts. In addition to
Magistrate Scheindlin, Judge Weinstein introduced three special mas-
ters into the case, two of whom were to act explicitly as settlement
masters to help the parties reach a settlement. 9
One does not have to accept Professor Fiss' absolutist notions
95 See id. at 93.
11 See id. at 96-98. Apparently, Monsanto and Diamond Shamrock, as the two
"dirtiest" manufacturers, were reluctant to agree because they feared they would lose
on the government contract defense, whether before a judge or a jury. See id. at 96.
97 See id. at 111-12.
9 See id. at 122. Schuck suggests that part of Judge Weinstein's motivation may
have included the somewhat symbolic gesture of involving someone who was on the
payroll of the United States government. See id.
91 See id. at 144-47.
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"cagainst settlement"'00 to be suspicious of the settlement style adopted
in Agent Orange. The dominant motive to "settle" this case by both the
judge and the masters may have impaired the integrity of the process.
Some of the objections to the Agent Orange settlement, such as judicial
over-reaching and over-commitment and procedural unfairness, can be
directed at both the judge and the masters.' But the use of a special
master exacerbates many of the problems, particularly where informa-
tion is communicated to the parties indirectly by the masters. Although
one special master model of settlement could "purify" the process by
insulating the parties from the judge who makes preliminary rulings
and ultimately tries the case,'0 2 the master's most effective settlement
weapon is likely to be contact with and leverage through the judge.
The expense of a special master in these very exceptional kinds of
litigations also must be considered.10 3 The addition of a special master,
who usually charges a normal hourly fee,'0 can be staggering. 105 In
many cases, the costs are divided between both parties, although in
Agent Orange it was defendants who paid the entire bill. 0 6 To the
100 See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1095 (1984) ("1 do
not believe that settlement as a generic practice . . .should be institutionalized....
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the
absence of a trial and a judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome;
and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.").
101 See Schuck, The Role ofJudges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 359 (1986).
.02 In England, the use of "masters at law" to settle cases serves this precise pur-
pose. See Silberman, supra note 53, at 1106-07.
103 Commentary on special master fees has been sparse. See generally Levine,
Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 142 (1985) (noting that
the question of fees for special masters has been overlooked).
104 Ordinarily, masters will charge their hourly fees unless some other arrange-
ment has been made, and courts will generally appoint them at that rate. But see Reed
v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the hourly rate
the special master charged was excessive); see also Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S.
921, 921 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part) ("I do not suggest that Special Mas-
ters should serve without compensation, as for example, Senior Federal Judges have
done for a number of years in such cases, but I believe the public service aspect of the
appointment is a factor that is not to be wholly ignored in determining the reasonable-
ness of fees charged in a case like this.").
10' The fees for the three special masters in Agent Orange were said to "total[]
hundreds of thousands of dollars." Schuck, supra note 101, at 348. More recent esti-
mates suggest that special master Ken Feinberg and his firm alone received more than
three million dollars in fees and expenses from the litigation. See Labaton, Five Years
After Settlement, Agent Orange War Lives On, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1989, at D1, col.
1.
10' Neither does there appear to be any obstacle to imposing special master costs
on only one of the private parties, particularly if it is that party who has necessitated
the need for a special master. See Brazil, Complex Cases, supra note 59, at 404; see
also Brock v. Ing, 827 F.2d 1426, 1428 (10th Cir. 1987) (expense of master should be
borne by the "wrongdoer"). In cases involving the government, the United States has
taken the position that sovereign immunity prevents the imposition of special master
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extent that utilization of special masters shortens pre-trial time, there
may be a net effect of reducing parties' litigation costs,1 0 7 if it is not
offset by the additional expense of paying the special master. There
also remains the danger that special masters encourage more elaborate
procedures and, in the end, lengthen pre-trial time. As references to
special masters become more prevalent in less unusual cases, the ex-
pense factor bears closer examination.
AT&T, the Ohio asbestos litigation, and Agent Orange may be
cases in which no formalistic rules of any kind would suffice and,
therefore, the individualized and customized treatment undertaken by
special masters was the only practical alternative. Although the Admin-
istrative Office does not have precise statistics on cases where special
masters are appointed,'0 8 a Westlaw search reveals that they are being
used in a substantial number of cases other than the mega-litigation
described above.'0 9 Because extensive discovery and substantial pre-trial
motion practice is no longer unusual in much federal litigation, it is not
surprising that judges are attracted to the option of using special mas-
ters to ease the pre-trial burden. Some judges have seen the use of spe-
cial masters in environmental litigation, for example, to be appropri-
ate-to supervise and conduct pre-trial discovery, to oversee and
encourage stipulations of facts between the parties, to hear and make
recommendations on dispositive matters such as summary judgment,
and even to prepare reports on liability and ultimate remedies. Two
courts of appeals have reviewed such uses of special masters in CER-
CLA actions, where the United States has sought to recover cleanup
costs against a large number of defendants. Both courts found the dis-
trict courts' delegations to special masters too broad and inconsistent
with Rule 53(b), but differed in the way they thought special masters
could properly be used. In United States v. Conservation Chemical
Co.,"' a special master was given authority "to order and preside over
pre-trial hearings . . . to supervise and issue recommendations regard-
ing pre-trial matters, and . . . to hold hearings and issue recommenda-
tions on the claims for inclusion in any injunctive relief order and ap-
portionment of costs.""' The district judge denied a motion to vacate
the reference, ruling that a number of "exceptional conditions" were
fees against it, but without success. See Trout v. Ball, 705 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1989).
107 Chief Judge Kaufman argued that the expeditious pre-trial by the special
master would result in a reduced net expense for the parties. See Kaufman, supra note
15, at 468.
'0' Telephone call to Office of Court Administration.
109 See data base on file with author.
220 106 F.R.D. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
"I Id. at 216.
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present: voluminous technical and scientific data relevant to the liability
issue, extensive discovery complicated by the absence of accurate docu-
mentation because certain business records had been destroyed, and the
need for prompt resolution of this environmental endangerment. Sev-
eral of the defendants sought mandamus, and in In re Armco, Inc., the
court concluded that reference to the master for trial was inappropriate
but upheld the power of the master to conduct pre-trial discovery and
to make recommendations with respect to dispositive motions, such as
summary judgment.112 The court also held that the master, after a de-
termination of liability by the court itself, could conduct hearings and
make recommendations with respect to damages and other relief.
In a similar case in the Sixth Circuit, however, the Court of Ap-
peals in In re United States reversed a district judge's reference to the
special master, under which she had authority to supervise the case and
to "submit recommendations on all motions filed in the action after or-
dering sufficient briefing and an oral hearing, if necessary."1 Not-
withstanding the district court's articulation of the exceptional condi-
tions warranting the reference (calendar congestion, complexity of
issues, lengthy trial, extraordinary pre-trial management in a case with
more than 250 parties, and public interest in speedy disposition of the
matter), the Court of Appeals found that only the reference of non-
dispositive pre-trial matters was justified." 4 Emphasizing that under
Rule 53(e)(2) the district court must review the special master's recom-
mendations and reject any findings of fact that are clearly erroneous,
the Sixth Circuit observed that there was little time saved by use of a
special master to hear pre-trial motions which would have to be briefed
and argued twice: once before the judge and once before the master.
And to the extent that the judge's burden was eased because the scope
of review is limited by the clearly erroneous standard, the Court of
Appeals still found the reference objectionable in that the master, and
not the court, would decide the case. The Court of Appeals gave less
attention to the portion of the order referring supervision of discovery
and "non-dispositive" pre-trial motions to the master, possibly because
the government had earlier acquiesced in a limited reference of certain
discovery motions and did not press in its mandamus petition the
court's requirement that the government pay half of the special master's
fees." 5 In seeming to approve the more limited role in discovery for the
112 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985).
113 In re United States, 816 F.2d 1083, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
114 See id. at 1088-89.
15 The government's present position is that absent its consent, sovereign immu-
nity precludes the imposition of such costs by the court.
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special master, the Court of Appeals noted that the large number of
parties involved in the case could justify a reference of such non-dispos-
itive discovery matters.
The Sixth Circuit is presumably correct in its view that special
masters can be extremely useful in this narrower discovery role, but
institutional concerns remain. My colleague Professor (now Dean)
John Sexton was appointed as a special master in the Love Canal liti-
gation, another CERCLA environmental case.116 There, plaintiffs-the
United States, New York State, and UDC Love Canal-brought an
action against several chemical companies, most notably Hooker Chem-
icals (now Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCC)), that dumped millions of
pounds of chemicals into the Love Canal trench.
Judge Curtin's decision to appoint a special master was appar-
ently prompted by the extensive document discovery requested by OCC
and the state's claim of "deliberative privilege" for many of the re-
quested documents. Interestingly, the option of referring those matters
to a magistrate for in camera review was rejected on the grounds of the
heavy caseload in the district which presumably was also occupying
magistrate time. Whether any of the parties actually objected to the use
of a special master is unclear, but they did participate in the selection
of the master by nominating a pool of potential candidates from which
Sexton was ultimately selected." 7
As a matter of principle, the lack of formal procedures for selec-
tion of a special master is troubling. Indeed, in many of the earlier
special master cases, such as La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.," 8 the
courts intimated that practitioners who served in the role often contrib-
uted to the delay in processing the case. The modern-day special mas-
ters, however, have more often than not been either prominent exper-
ienced practitioners with particular pre-trial expertise and the ability to
make nearly full-time commitments, or prestigious academics with im-
peccable credentials and time flexibility. (A quick survey of the special
masters in the cases noted here suggests that there is also a highly re-
garded crew of academic "proceduralists" who have contributed not
only to the processing of the individual case, but also to conceptual
thinking about pre-trial management and innovative practices for'com-
plex litigation.) Notwithstanding the high level of energy and compe-
tence of these individuals, they are selected from a narrow circle and
16 See United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1470 (W.D.N.Y.
1985).
11 See Correspondence in Love Canal case (on file at University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
118 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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have no institutional imprimatur to function as decision makers.' 19 Cer-
tainly when parties have not agreed to either the special master refer-
ence in general or to the person in particular, such "judicial" substitu-
tion in a case seems objectionable, particularly where the parties must
bear the expenses. Consent by the parties alleviates some of these con-
cerns, but there is always a danger that such consent might be less than
voluntary because of judicial pressure to accept appointment of a spe-
cial master. Indeed, even where true consent is obtained, the case shap-
ing and the law articulation process set in motion becomes the province
of a set of private judges. I have no quarrel with those litigants who are
willing to pay a price for private judging and are prepared to opt out of
the public system of courts (through resort to arbitration, or to some
other private ADR mechanism). 20 However, the special master system
continues to be a peculiar hybrid; for even where parties are willing to
pay for a special master, they return (at taxpayer expense, of course) to
the judge to seek review of the master's rulings. 2' To the extent that
no review is requested or when review becomes proforma, adjudication
of some important issues has then been inappropriately abdicated to the
special master, and there is always the danger that the judge does not
engage in the intellectual process of decision making once a special
master has made her report.
Sexton's role in the Love Canal case highlights some of my misgiv-
ings. One issue which emerged in the discovery phase of the litigation
was whether state officials were entitled to invoke "deliberative privi-
lege," which protects state officials from revealing views communicated
119 Compare the procedures for selecting magistrates, which are set forth in AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE SELECTION AND AP-
POINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES (1987) and now include the use of
merit selection panels. Magistrates also have the advantage of familiarity with many of
the discovery issues that arise in litigation. The academics may be one step removed,
and private litigators who function in a particular case may have potential conflicts of
interest given their own discovery practices.
120 If the parties choose arbitration, however, the decision of the arbitrator is gen-
erally not subject to judicial challenge, except for bias or misconduct on the part of the
arbitrator. Where parties are diverted to alternative dispute procedures within the court
system, which they may use free of charge, questions of efficiency and cost have also
been raised. See Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CmI. L. REV. 366, 390-91
(1986).
121 Under Federal Rule 53(e)(2), the master's finding of facts are subject to re-
view on a clearly erroneous standard and issues of law are fully reviewable. Of course,
the parties may stipulate to making findings of fact by the master "final" and not
subject to review. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4). However, such stipulation must be
clear. Cf Turner v. Orr, 722 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1984) (unclear whether "special
master" appointed pursuant to consent agreement was essentially an arbitrator, who
could make binding decisions, or a Rule 53 special master), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020
(1986).
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within government circles. During depositions, another claim of privi-
lege by state officials emerged-a "mental process" privilege, which
protects officers from revealing their unexpressed thoughts or opinions
about official policy. Although Professor Sexton had guidance from
Judge Curtin on the earlier deliberative privilege, the question of the
"mental process" privilege was close to one of first impression. Dean
Sexton authored an innovative and path-breaking ruling on this issue,
later affirmed by Judge Curtin. 2' Although not "merits" issues, these
kinds of issues may have precedental effect in other cases.
Another tentative hypothesis I have put forward relates to the po-
tential hydraulic quality of discovery when a special master is brought
in. Judicial adjuncts, of course, were instituted precisely to handle the
overflow of discovery, but their presence in the system does not necessa-
rily encourage self-restraint. In the Love Canal litigation, for example,
the appointment of the special master seems to have generated addi-
tional document production and additional privilege claims. Whether
this is the result of the normal discovery flow over time or whether the
state was more reluctant to put Judge Curtin to so large a task of docu-
ment review than to burden Dean Sexton who provided a full-time pair
of eyes reviewing the documents is, of course, only speculation.
Another set of relatively common cases that are likely to generate
increased use of special masters are cases under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. In a recent appellate case in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, the panel majority denied the government's petition for a writ of
mandamus to direct the district judge to revoke appointment of a spe-
cial master. In that case, In re United States Department of Defense,1
23
the Washington Post sought production of classified Defense Depart-
ment documents relating to the Government's efforts in 1980 to rescue
the Iranian hostages. When Judge Oberdorfer, the district judge, indi-
cated his intention to appoint a special master, the government objected
and proposed that it assemble a random sampling of the 2,000 docu-
ments, which could then be examined by the judge in camera-a pro-
cedure used in several other FOIA cases. However, Judge Oberdorfer
rejected this approach and instead appointed as special master a Wash-
ington attorney who was a former intelligence counsel at the Depart-
ment of Justice and held top-secret security clearance. It was contem-
plated that the special master would develop a representative sampling
of documents for which privilege was claimed, would summarize for
122 See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 123 F.R.D. 3 (W.D.N.Y.
1988). The special master's rulings are included as an appendix. See Hooker Chem.,
123 F.R.D. at 12-61.
123 848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the judge the arguments relating to the exemptions, but would make no
recommendation. The government argued that the exceptional condition
requirement for appointment of a special master had not been met and
that alternative procedures for resolving the privilege claim were avail-
able. In rejecting the petition for mandamus, the court held that the
writ of mandamus should not be used to "second-guess trial judges in
situations where they have not exceeded their 'prescribed
jurisdiction.' "124
Not only does this case endorse the use of special masters in what
may be a large category of cases, but it also highlights the difficulty of
challenging such appointments, which are interlocutory orders and not
appealable, except by the difficult mandamus route. In a strong dissent,
Judge Starr insisted that no showing of an exceptional condition had
been made, particularly when other avenues suggested by the Govern-
ment for review of the documents had not been explored. 25 Noting that
use of a special master would undoubtedly "make life easier," Judge
Starr cautioned that Article III judges must be charged with resolving
sensitive FOIA disputes and that the majority's failure to demand par-
ticularized reasons in this case for the appointment of a special master
made it impossible to distinguish this case from any other multi-docu-
ment, national security one. 2 ' As he admonished, "ft]he yellow light is
flashing."' 27
As the above examples indicate, the most prevalent use of special
masters has been in the area of pre-trial discovery. I have indicated
ways in which I believe that delegations of even "judicial management"
tasks come with some institutional cost because they cannot be totally
divorced from decision making itself. But in addition, once a judge dele-
gates discovery matters to the special master, the special master may be
asked to rule on other dispositive motions.'2 " For example, in Societe
Liz v. Charles of the Ritz Group,'29 after a master was appointed to
handle discovery motions, 130 both the parties and the judge agreed to
124 Id. at 238 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)). Judge
Wald, the author of the majority opinion, commented more extensively on the case and
the role of special masters in Wald, "Some Exceptional Condition"--The Anatomy of
a Decision Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405
(1988).
125 See Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 240-41 (Starr, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 241 (Starr, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 243 (Starr, J., dissenting).
12 Professor Brazil observes that the forces of gravity in litigation tend to increase
a master's role as time goes on, and prior involvement becomes the rationale for contin-
ued and expanded authority. See Brazil, Complex Cases, supra note 59, at 396 n.6.
129 118 F.R.D. 2 ( D.D.C. 1987).
10 See id. at 3.
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have the master rule on a set of dispositive motions involving the valid-
ity of choice-of-forum clauses, the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust
laws, and important issues of antitrust and conspiracy laws. 3' Even if
the master's one hundred plus page opinion is the equal of (or even
surpasses) a "district judge opinion," institutional accountability is
missing. The district judge, who need only subject the report to a
CC132 haeai"clearly erroneous" standard of review, may have achieved a sub-
stantial saving of time, but it is then the special master and not the
judge who becomes the "decision maker." If the needs of the judicial
system mandate delegation of this order of judicial business to judicial
adjuncts, magistrates are the more appropriate alternate decision mak-
ers. They are full-time judicial officials, selected according to prescribed
procedures, and designated by Congress to assume these tasks. The law
articulation function does not belong in the hands of either the private
bar on a part-time basis or the academics, for both of whom there are
potential conflicts of interest.
A reported Seventh Circuit decision, Jack Walters & Sons Corp.
v. Morton Building,3 ' provides another illustrative example of reflex-
ive and overbroad delegation. Confronted with the unfortunate but now
commonplace lengthy motion for summary judgment, accompanied by
several thousand pages of materials, the district judge referred the pro-
ceedings to a special master who prepared a report which was eventu-
ally adopted by the judge apparently without independent analysis.'13
In affirming the judgment of the district court on appeal, Judge Posner
took the opportunity to observe that the district court had gone beyond
its proper bounds in delegating the matter to a special master. Since the
Rule 53(b) issue was not raised on appeal, the court was unprepared to
prolong the proceedings by vacating the reference on its own initiative,
but it did warn that the use of special masters in antitrust and other
complex litigation should be conducted with greater sensitivity to the
problem of excessive delegation of judicial power.'
3 5
"I See Special Master's Amended Recommendation re: Dispositive Motions, So-
ciete Liz, 118 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 1987).
132 Federal Rule 53(e)(2) states that the court shall accept the master's findings of
fact unless clearly erroneous. After a hearing the court may "adopt the report or may
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may
recommit it with instructions." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2). The "clearly erroneous" fac-
tual review standard makes little sense on dispositive motions and seems inconsistent
with the standard of review for magistrates on similar rulings.
133 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
"' The special master's report was "indistinguishable in form from a judicial
opinion; and the district judge approved that opinion rather than write his own." Id. at
712.
... See id. at 713; see also Apex Fountain Sales v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089,
1096-97 (3d Cir. 1987) (reference of contempt motion to special master was improper).
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Without proper statistics it is difficult to know just how serious is
the problem of excessive delegations.'3 6 Case law is not revealing since
a reference order is not immediately appealable even when objected to,
and in some instances consent of the parties may be obtained through a
certain veiled coercion. It is interesting to note that in 1986, the Justice
Department for the first time announced an express policy regarding
special masters with a directive to consent to a special master in only a
narrow class of cases.
13 7
My point is not that special masters cannot be helpful in particu-
lar cases, but that there has developed an almost Pavlovian response to
the complicated case-delegation to a special master. A rethinking of
traditional rulemaking philosophy, which has been marked by informal
management techniques, excessive delegation, broad discretion and
trans-substantive application, seems to me a welcome alternative.
One other specific use of special masters deserves comment
here-the appointment of a master for settlement purposes.' 8 Func-
tionally, of course, the role is often subtly played by the master who is
technically appointed to oversee discovery. Some judges, however, have
separated out the settlement task more definitively in their reference
orders. For example, in the Agent Orange case, although Judge Wein-
stein substituted a magistrate for the special master on discovery mat-
ters, he then appointed three lawyers as separate "settlement mas-
ters."'3 9 Judge Aspen in Chicago has appointed special masters as
"mediators" in both "complex and routine" cases.'4" Notwithstanding
the success (and increasing prevalence) of some of these efforts, it
should be noted that use of such judicial adjuncts technically should
meet, under the present rules, the exceptional condition requirement for
the appointment of a master under Rule 53(b). 4 ' There is, of course,
nothing to stop parties from voluntarily choosing an outside party to
help settle their dispute, but it is not clear that consent to the formal
appointment of a special master suspends the requirement of Rule
53(b). Quite apart from the restrictions of Rule 53(b), it might be ar-
gued that Federal Rule 16 is authority for the court to experiment with
188 The Office of Court Administration does not keep statistics on appointments of
special masters.
1M7 See Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney-General, Department Policy
Regarding Special Masters (Mar. 13, 1986).
1"' For a discussion of settlement devices, see D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRAT-
EGIES FOR FEDERAL DisTRicT JUDGES 58-67 (1986).
139 See P. SCHUCK, supra note 90, at 143-67.
140 See Aspen, Use of Special Masters for Intensive Mediation (and/or Arbitra-
tion) (unpublished) (on file at University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
141 But see Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks, supra note 17, at 306 (arguing that
Rule 53 does not cover pre-trial special masters at all).
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extrajudicial settlement techniques in the name of pre-trial manage-
ment. Rule 16(c)(7) directs consideration of "the possibility of settle-
ment or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute" at
the pre-trial conference, but there is no evidence that Rule 16 repre-
sents an invitation for increased delegation to special masters whom the
parties must pay.14 Of course, to the extent that experience demon-
strates that third party mediation and settlement functions done under
court auspices are effective, statutory or rule changes can be made. The
policy issue is thus the one to be addressed.
The private master as a settlement facilitator might seem, in some
respect, the least intrusive or objectionable role of the ones we have
examined. But unless the master comes armed with the coercive power
of the judge (and possibly with disclosures as to the judge's views on
some of the issues in the case, as there was in Agent Orange), it is
unclear that the intervention of an outside party will have any real
impact on settlement. To the extent cases ultimately do settle, there is
little evidence that third party intervention is in fact the catalyst for
settlement. Indeed, additional expense and time of the special master
may add overall to the parties' litigation costs. Moreover, if the master
is effective because of leverage that comes from behind the scenes con-
tact between the master and judge, serious questions of ethics and pol-
icy are presented. Of course, where the parties consent to a master for
settlement, some of these objections are less pronounced, but the danger
is that the "consent" is not always so voluntarily forthcoming.
• Along with the danger of involuntary consent, I have alluded to
potential conflicts of interest that may arise from using special masters
who serve only for a particular case. Not only is there the traditional
kind of conflict that may arise because the master may have represented
or opposed parties and lawyers who come before him, but also more
subtle conflicts in approaches to particular issues and views of the mer-
its may infect decision-making by those who by definition wear dual
hats. The more traditional conflict came before the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Jenkins v. Sterlacci,"43 where the spe-
cial master was contemporaneously the lawyer-adversary of a law firm
42 Cf Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987)
(mandatory summary jury trial not authorized by local rules, although parties could
clearly consent). But see McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 47-49 (E.D. Ky.
1988) (disagreeing with Strandell); Arabian-Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (same). Moreover, the Advisory Committee was quite clear that the
thrust of Rule 16 was for judges to manage their cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advi-
sory committee notes.
4s 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir.), petition for reh'g denied per curiam, 856 F.2d 274
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
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also representing one of the litigants in the proceeding before the spe-
cial master. The Court of Appeals found that the ABA Code of Judi-
cial Conduct was by its terms applicable to any officer performing judi-
cial functions, including a special master.144 It also reasoned that the
"clear error" standard that insulates the special master's findings
makes the special master "functionally indistinguishable" '145 from a
trial judge, and thus the special master must be held to the same stan-
dards applicable to the conduct of judges. Although ultimately holding
that the law firm had waived any objection based on the appearance of
bias in the particular case, the District of Columbia Circuit went on to
acknowledge the potential conflicts facing special masters:
who may wear different hats depending upon the profes-
sional function they are performing from one day to the
next. In one matter they may be required to observe the im-
partial decorum of a decisionmaker, while in another they
may be called upon to assume the perspective, and the parti-
ality, of an advocate. This duality of roles places a burden on
the special master with an active law practice, but its dis-
charge does not require that once he has accepted an assign-
ment as a special master, an attorney places his life as an
advocate in a state of suspended animation .... Instead, it is
sufficient and necessary, that an individual who accepts an
appointment as a special master scrupulously avoid any un-
144 Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), which sets a standard for disqualification
only for "any justice, judge or magistrate," the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges explicitly provides that a special master and anyone else perform-
ing judicial functions "is a judge for the purpose of this Code." See Jenkins, 849 F.2d
at 630.
'" Jenkins, 849 F.2d at 631.Jenkins squarely rejected the First Circuit's reason-
ing in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 426 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976), that special masters did not have to be held to the same strict standard of
impartiality as judges since they are "subject to the control of the court and since there
is a need to hire individuals with expertise in particular subject matters." See Jenkins,
849 F.2d at 630 n.1. In a recent case, the court ordered reference to a special master
vacated since the master was a paralegal in the law firm representing one of the parties
and in fact had served as a witness in favor of that party at the trial. See Petroleos
Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., 826 F.2d 392, 402 (5th Cir. 1987). Even though the
tasks referred to the master consisted largely of mechanically filing and indexing docu-
ments, the court reiterated its view that even this type of:
[a] special master 'should have no interest in or relationship to the parties
* * * and [should be] fit to perform the duties incumbent on one sitting in
the place of the court.' A special master has the duties and obligations of a
judicial officer. Having served as a witness for one side of the case, the
appointee was accordingly disqualified.
Id. at 402 (quoting Lister v. Commissioners Ct. of Navarro County, 566 F.2d 490, 493
(5th Cir. 1978)).
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dertaking, as an advocate or otherwise, that would tend or
appear to compromise his impartiality as a decisionmaker."
46
B. Remedial Special Masters
To complete the picture of judicial adjuncts in federal court litiga-
tion, I want to sketch briefly the now common use of the "remedial"
special master.
1 47
The modern "remedial" special master, who functions largely but
not exclusively in "public litigation," 148 bears only a slight resemblance
to his earlier predecessor.149 The earlier special masters, even if known
by another name, were regularly requested by judges to assess dam-
ages,150 or to distribute a trust corpus, or to perform other similarly
non-substantive roles. The modern "remedial" special master likewise
continues the tradition of involvement at the remedial phase after liabil-
ity has been determined but the scope of the adjuncts' powers is much
broader. 1 '
146 Jenkins, 849 F.2d at 632.
147 Post-disposition matters were often within the special master's role, and the
Clark Papers show that the advisory committee intended that the long tradition in eq-
uity of using special masters to perform tasks after a court had determined liability
were to be included in the Federal Rules. Both Rule 53 and Rule 70, which provides
for the appointment of a person to effect compliance with a judgment, are sources for
the appointment of remedial masters. See Levine, supra note 21, at 757-59.
148 The term "public law litigation" is amplified in Chayes, supra note 10. For
more recent developments, see Chayes, Foreward: Public Law Litigation and the Bur-
ger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1982).
149 See Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 543, 543 (1979); Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 60, at 466-67; Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
L.J. 635, 639 (1982); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change:Judicial Supervi-
sion of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1272-76 (1983); Jennings, The
Chancellor's Foot Begins to Kick. Judicial Remedies in Public Law Cases and the
Need for Procedural Reforms, 83 DICK. L. REV. 217, 236 (1979); Nathan, The Use of
Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 419, 422 (1979);
Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of In-
stitutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399, 407-12 (1981); Weinberg, supra
note 60, at 367; Special Project, supra note 60, at 805-09; Note, Force and Will: An
Exploration of the Use of Special Masters to Implement Judicial Decrees, 52 U. COLO.
L. REV. 105, 107-08 (1980).
"I See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 317 (1920) (holding that the ap-
pointment of an auditor in a law case is permissible); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512,
516-17 (1889) (master to review documents and render a preliminary accounting).
"'1 Even apart from public institutional litigation, remedial masters' tasks have
expanded. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.N.J.
1979) (special masters appointed to compute backpay will be required to handle discov-
ery disputes and engage in fact-finding), afftd, 647 F.2d 388 (1981). But more likely,
masters assume their broadest remedial charge in prison and other institutional litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (special master appointed
in connection with prison reform litigation), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). See
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There are, with subtle variations, several different functions a
master may play in the post-trial phase of litigation."5 2 In one situation,
the judge appoints the special master even before the decree has been
drawn up and uses the master in an investigative and fact-finding role
to aid in shaping the decree. In other situations, the decree (or often the
consent judgment) has been formulated by the court, but additional ac-
tivity is necessary to implement it. For that reason, judicial decrees or-
dering the remedying of conditions violative of an individual's constitu-
tional rights also will include appointment of a special master. 1 53 Often
connected to the administrative function is an oversight and monitoring
function to assure that those responsible for complying with the decree
are doing so in good faith.154 To this end, special masters are often
vested with authority to take certain action or make certain orders to
achieve compliance.
There is substantial evidence to indicate that violations of constitu-
tional rights, when asserted against institutional defendants, can be
remedied only when effective follow-up takes place,' 55 usually by the
special master. In this sense, special masters preserve rather than
threaten judicial integrity. Moreover, masters often have particular ex-
pertise which enables them to bring a realistic and practical approach
generally Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The Evolution
of Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 739 (1980) (discussing role of special masters); Dobray, The Role of
Masters in Court-Ordered Institutional Reform, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 581 (1982) (dis-
cussing the authority and responsibility of special masters); Horowitz, supra note 149,
at 1297-1302 (describing the broad powers of special masters in enforcing and super-
vising judicial decrees).
152 See Brakel, supra note 149, at 544-46; Horowitz, supra note 149, at 1298-
1302; Weinberg, supra note 60, at 370.
153 See, e.g., Gary W. v., State of La. Dep't of Health and Human Resources,
861 F.2d 1366, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (master at remedial phase to monitor compliance
with order correcting violations of constitutional magnitude in state's treatment of men-
tally retarded children placed in non-resident institutions); EEOC v. Local 638, 700 F.
Supp. 739, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (hearing and report on plaintiff's motion for holding
defendants in contempt of prior court order ordering anti-discrimination measures).
'a Cases challenging the sufficiency of institutional treatment often require the
appointment of special masters at the compliance phase. See, e.g., Lewis v. Woods, 848
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1988).
155 In an unpublished paper, Special Masters in Prison Litigation: Who? What?
Why? (1985), my New York University colleague, Professor Jim Jacobs, argues that
the vindication of constitutional rights for prisoners would be virtually impossible with-
out the expertise of special masters, many of whom have worked in the complex world
of prison bureaucracy. Leading prison reform cases that have required special master
intervention include Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1116, and Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917,
935 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified in part on other grounds, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); see also M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION:
IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 254, 260
(1977). For a discussion of masters in school desegregation cases, see Aronow, supra
note 151.
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to their shaping, monitoring, and/or compliance functions. 5 '
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be less than completely sanguine
about the role of special masters in the remedial phase of institutional
litigation. 5 Overbroad delegations of authority to judicial adjuncts
often accompany appointments of special masters. The concern is both
a general one about the propriety of the judicial role, particularly in
relation to other branches of government and interference with state
institutions, 8 and the distinct worry that private adjuncts are inappro-
priate actors in this regard.15 9 Recent guidelines of the United States
Department of Justice, for example, state that it is inappropriate for a
court to use a master to extend its own power, noting that "enhance-
ment of judicial power will usually be at the expense of a coordinate
branch of government."'6 0 Professor Owen Fiss, not a natural ally of
the Meese Justice Department, makes the quite distinct point that ap-
pointment of special masters deflects responsibility from the judge. Fiss
suggests alternatives, such as using expert witnesses or involving amici
to advise the judge, to "avoid the bureaucratic pathologies inherent in
the fragmentation and delegation of decisional power . . . ."' Unlike
the Justice Department, of course, Fiss does not object to the judicial
role at all, but to the fact that a species of "subjudge" is now making
primary decisions.
The expense of a special master-which often includes an entire
administrative bureaucracy 12_is yet another consideration. In the
... Vincent Nathan, a law professor whose expertise is criminal law, was the
master in several prison cases. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 440 F. Supp. 60, 65 (N.D.
Ohio 1977); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 198 (N.D. Ohio 1976). Professor
Curtis Berger's expertise in housing was one reason for his appointment as special
master in the Coney Island school desegregation case, in which Judge Weinstein was
seeking to impose broad remedial relief likely to affect housing patterns. See Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 767 (E.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
..7 See Brakel, supra note 149, at 569; Horowitz, supra note 149, at 1303-07;
Jennings, supra note 149, at 235-36; Note, supra note 149, at 115-22.
1"8 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 451 U.S. 1, 55 (1981); Brakel,
supra note 149, at 543.
... See Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary (Mar. 16, 1983) (unpub-
lished paper) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), noting that
special masters are "appointed with increasing frequency in litigation seeking the struc-
tural reform of large scale organizations . . . . I am devoted to such litigation and view
it as critical to the proper discharge of the judicial function .... but it also seems to
me that there is a risk that subjudges will be created by the judge as a way of avoiding
unpleasant tasks and deflecting responsibility." Id. at 27.
180 Department of Justice, supra note 137.
181 Fiss, supra note 159, at 28.
182 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (committee
appointed to monitor the implementation of health, education, and safety standards for
Alabama prisons), cert. denied sub nom. Neuan v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915; see also
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large institutional cases, special master expenses may run into hundreds
of thousands of dollars for many years."6 3 Moreover, compliance with
the decree itself may require large outlays of public funds, and institu-
tional defendants may point to fiscal concerns and budget limitations as
relevant in deciding how any decree should be effectuated.164 The sensi-
tive interplay between the courts and the institutional actors thus ar-
gues against overbroad delegations of authority to judicial adjuncts. It is
true, of course, that the question of the propriety of using judicial ad-
juncts in the remedial phase of litigation has often become confused
with the overriding issue in public cases of this genre-whether dis-
putes of this nature are susceptible to judicial resolution and judicial
enforcement at all.' 5 The appointment of a special master, because it
makes possible the extension of the judicial role, then becomes the focus
of the attack.
More carefully drawn references which use judicial adjuncts in
those situations where appointment is necessary to achieve compliance
with and implementation of the decree and which limit the discretion
and authority of the master are one possible solution to the problem.
Certainly when acting pursuant to a narrowly drawn reference and
with proper and diligent supervision by the court, remedial masters can
operate effectively as the judge's eyes and ears outside the courtroom.
There are several recent examples where broad delegations of au-
thority to special masters have provoked strong reactions. In Hart v.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 526 F. Supp. 423, 424 (E.D.Pa. 1981) (discuss-
ing expense of the offices of special master and hearing master).
163 Monthly bills in the Pennhurst litigation amounted to around $70,000.00. See
Halderman, 526 F. Supp. at 424. For an excellent overview of the expenses associated
with special masters, see Levine, supra note 103. Levine notes the controversy in Cali-
fornia that arose when Senior District Judge Weigel appointed his very young and
inexperienced law clerk as the special master in a complex prison case. See id. at 142
n.6, 198 n.300; see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S.
1069 (1987).
1" It is clear that a judge has authority to implement equitable relief, notwith-
standing that public funds must be used to pay the cost. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 268 (1977), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a court order requir-
ing Michigan to spend general state education funds to compensate previously inade-
quate education for black school children in Detroit. In Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 496-505, 303 A.2d 273, 285-89 (1973), the court invoked the state constitution to
mandate equal educational opportunities throughout the state, and after years of bitter
feuding, forced the state legislature to enact a state income tax since it was the only
way to raise the revenue to implement the decision. Perhaps because of the potentially
significant impact on the state legislative budget, Jennings proposes revising the Fed-
eral Rules to require that the chief executive officer and the chief fiscal officer of a state
be notified when a remedy "may require substantial expenditures of public funds."
Jennings, supra note 149, at 238.
165 See Special Project, supra note 60, at 805-09.
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Community School Board,6 6 Judge Weinstein found school authorities
liable for segregated conditions in the schools and also placed partial
responsibility on housing authorities. After the defendants-and other
third parties 67 -had submitted plans for preparing a remedy, Judge
Weinstein determined that he needed additional information and exper-
tise in formulating a decree. He then appointed Professor Curtis Berger
as a special master to explore options that he might consider in choos-
ing a remedy. As Professor Berger himself pointed out, as special
master he was not directed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law, but rather to conduct a roving investigation, visiting the schools,
meeting with community groups, assessing the needs for low-income
housing, and then submitting a report which had no legal status. 68
Perhaps Judge Weinstein thought that this somewhat open course for
the special master would help bring about cooperation and settlement,
and that the special master might eventually play a mediative role in
the conflict. In the end, however, the unchartered course and lack of
judicial guidance of the special master may explain why much of his
report was not instrumental in the ultimate decree that was
rendered.' 9
In Hart, the master had been brought in to help shape the remedy
to be issued by the court. The more usual place of the special master is
at the "implementation" stage or the monitoring-compliance stage.
Here too, however, there are dangers that too much discretion is left in
the hands of the special master. For example, in Taylor v. Perini,'
the special master was empowered to act for the Court with the "au-
thority to state to the defendant ... the actions required to be taken by
them ... to effectuate full compliance with the Court's order . . . ." '
An order such as this amounts to almost complete judicial abdication.
Although there is little judicial authority as to the precise limits of
a special master's authority, it is clear that the breadth of the order
may be relevant in determining whether judicial oversight and monitor-
166 383 F. Supp. 699, 756-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
117 Judge Weinstein involved many others-the Metropolitan Transit Authority,
city, state, and federal housing officials, and the New York City police depart-
ment-none of whom were defendants in the case. See id. at 758-60.
168 See Berger, Away from the Courthouse and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a
Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707, 711 & n.10 (1978).
169 See id. at 733-38.
170 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
17 Id. at 193; see also Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 85-86 (N.D. Ohio
1976) (master had power to hold hearings, have unlimited access to the files and the
prison facility, have confidential interviews with any and all personnel and inmates,
attend otherwise private internal meetings, and request show cause contempt orders
from the judge).
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ing of a decree is appropriate. In one recent decision, National Organi-
zation for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen,'172 the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld an order of reference for a special master to monitor
compliance of a preliminary injunction against the government's mari-
juana-destroying patrol (whose acronym is CAMP) and stressed the
limited powers given to the special master. In NORML, a prior prelim-
inary injunction had ordered CAMP not to conduct warrantless
searches, not to detain people illegally, and not to violate FAA safety
regulations in its patrol planes. When the plaintiff class moved for con-
tempt, the court denied the motion but amended the injunction to re-
quire certain specific prophylactic measures to be taken by defendants
and announced the appointment of a special master under Rule 53 to
monitor compliance.'
In approving the special master reference (and imposing the costs
thereof on the defendants, including the United States), 4 the court ap-
proved the use of a master to act both as monitor and as hearing officer.
Critical to the court was the fact that the parties were afforded the
opportunity to submit written objections to the master's reports and
findings, thus emphasizing the continuing role of the district court. In
addition, the court pointed out that the special master could not "'pur-
port to direct any CAMP activities or agents, or issue orders,' "h and
thereby did not control or administer functions of any government
defendant.
But a much broader grant of authority to special masters-albeit
in a federal suit against state officials and institutions-provoked ex-
press comment and criticism by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.'17 Having
found violations of state and federal law by the state-operated mental
health residential facility, the district court ordered (among other
things) that suitable community living arrangements be provided for all
Pennhurst residents and that individual treatment plans be developed
for each Pennhurst resident.' 7 7 The court also ordered a special master
to supervise the implementation of this order.'7 8 When the case eventu-
12 828 F.2d 536, 542-45 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter NORML].
17 See id. at 542-43.
174 The United States took the position, consistent with guidelines issued by the
Department of Justice, that sovereign immunity precluded the imposition of the special
master's costs. The court rejected the argument. See id. at 545.
17 Id. (quoting the district court's March 6 order of reference).
178 451 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1981).
177 See Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1326-29 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part,
612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
178 See Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1326.
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ally reached the Supreme Court, both the majority and the dissent ad-
dressed the question of remedy. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
noted that in no case had the Court "required a State to take on such
. ..burdensome obligations as providing 'appropriate' treatment in the
'least restrictive' environment,"179 and Justice White's dissent more
specifically criticized the special master appointment:
More properly, the court should have announced what it
thought was necessary to comply with the Act and then per-
mitted an appropriate period for the State to decide whether
it preferred to give up federal funds and go its own route. If
it did not, it should propose a plan for achieving compliance.
• .. In any event, however, the court should not have as-
sumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the
first instance which patients should remain and which
should be removed. 180
Holding that federal law did not support the least restrictive alter-
native standard imposed by the lower courts, the Supreme Court in
Pennhurst reversed and remanded the case for a determination of
whether state law itself could support the plaintiffs' claims.' On re-
mand to the Third Circuit, a majority of the en banc panel held that
Pennsylvania state law created a substantive right to habilitation in the
least restrictive environment.'8 2 But the remedy continued to be troub-
lesome for several of the judges. Judge Aldisert, who concurred with
the majority, wrote separately to "seriously question the propriety of
the district court's appointment of a special master to supervise compli-
ance with the original remedy." Unwilling to vacate the order after the
expenditure of funds had already been made by the state, he expressed
hope that the district court would immediately "disassemble the judi-
cially-created administrative hierarchy of special and hearing mas-
ters. "183 Two of the dissenting judges, Judge Seitz and Judge Hunter,
also disapproved of the special master appointment to supervise compli-
ance. 84 Although they agreed that the special master would be useful
in helping the court formulate a remedy, they argued that because
plaintiffs failed to show that the state would defy any decree, the
master's oversight responsibilities were improper, based on "[p]rinciples
"79 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 29.
180 Id. at 54 (White, J., dissenting in part).
181 See id. at 24-25, 30-32.
182 673 F.2d 647, 654-55 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds and remanded,
465 U.S. 89 (1984).
183 Id. at 661-62 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
184 See id. at 662 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
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of federal-state comity. '  Judge Garth, in a separate dissent regard-
ing relief, argued that the Supreme Court's earlier admonitions against
using masters to oversee compliance by state officials under a federal-
state funding statute was afortiori as to a master seeking to bring state
officials into compliance with its own state laws." 6 The Supreme
Court, ultimately finding that the eleventh amendment precluded the
claims in Pennhurst, has had no further word on the propriety of a
special master in this litigation. But the opinions spawned in Pen-
nhurst8 7 indicate an evident discomfort with the intrusion of judicial
monitoring, particularly in the form of judicial adjuncts.
Undoubtedly, some special masters would prefer to proceed with
unfettered discretion. Given the self-perpetuating quality of their use
and the largely ruleless environment in which they proceed, however,
important issues of policy and decision-making are subtly being trans-
ferred from the judge to judicial adjuncts. Without limiting the reme-
dial powers of the federal courts, Rules 53 and 70 could be revised to
ensure that references to judicial adjuncts are made only in limited cir-
cumstances and after a hearing that compliance has not been, or is un-
likely to be, forthcoming. References should be drawn so that judges
retain close supervisory powers while granting narrow mandates to
their special masters to implement the judge's decisions and policy
choices. Structure and formality must replace the ad hoc individualized
approach to special masters that has come to dominate the remedial
phase of litigation.
C. Other Functions
The "traditional" functions of special masters have been alluded to
earlier, 88 and Rule 53(b) continues to authorize the use of masters "in
matters of account and of difficult computation of damages" without
the necessity of meeting the "exceptional condition" requirement. 9
Id. (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
188 See id. at 670 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to relief).
187 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
188 For the reasons explained previously, neither pre-trial supervision nor supervi-
sion of remedial relief falls within the category of the special masters' traditional role.
See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court confirmed the pro-
priety of using special masters in federal court litigation well before the advent of the
Federal Rules. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Kimberly v. Arms,
129 U.S. 512 (1889).
189 All references to a special master are subject to the "exceptional condition"
requirement "save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages." FED.
R. Civ. P. 53(b). The inclusion of "difficult computation of damages" as well as the
addition of assessors to take such references was added in 1966 (the year of unification
of admiralty procedure and civil procedure) and was intended to preserve the admiralty
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When special masters are used for these purposes, the procedures of
Rule 53(e) requiring a report and providing for review of the master's
report subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard make eminent good
sense. Broader references, such as the one in La Buy-to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the basis of the evidence
presented-are quite rare.190 One recent attempt to appoint a special
master in this way because the judge didn't understand "the jungle" of
trademark law was sternly rebuked by the court of appeals."' Masters
in jury cases are similarly reserved for the specialized case, often in-
volving complex damage issues.
1 92
Interestingly, it is not the traditional special master functions that
are reflected in practice. Rather, most special master references are for
pre-trial matters (both dispositive and non-dispositive), settlement, and
practice of referring difficult computations to assessors after an interlocutory judgment
determining liability. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2601 nn.1 & 8 (1970). References to masters for accounting and damages
computations are currently quite common, particularly in discrimination, attorneys'
fees, and patent matters. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union
638, 860 F.2d 1168 (2d Cir. 1988) ("administrator" appointed to do damages account-
ing in Title VII backpay award); Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197
(3rd Cir. 1988) (accounting in patent case); Hartwick College v. United States, 801
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1986) (master to calculate attorneys' fees under Equal Access to
Justice Act in tax case, as well as decide individual monetary claims). For an interest-
ing variation on this theme, see Hartness Int'l Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819 F.2d
1100 (Fed. Cir. 1987), in which a special master appointed to calculate damages and
lost profits in turn appointed an accounting firm.
190 See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 253 (1957). A search of
circuit and district court cases involving the use of special masters from 1985 through
the present revealed very few cases with the type of broad reference disallowed in La
Buy. Nevertheless, special masters received such broad delegations in a few cases. See
Wayzata Bank & Trust v. A & B Farms, 855 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1988) (findings of
fact and conclusions of law in fiduciary breach case); United States v. Lummi Indian
Tribe, 841 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (entire case referred); NLRB v. Southwire Co.,
801 F.2d 1252 (11th Cir. 1986) (findings of fact and conclusions of law in civil con-
tempt motion); Apex Fountain Sales v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1096-97 (3d Cir.
1987) (reference of contempt motion held improper); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Altech Indus.,
Inc., 117 F.R.D. 650 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (presided over jury trial).
191 See Madrigal Audio Labs. Inc. v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir.
1986). District Judge Eginton had appointed a special master after telling the parties:
"I don't understand anything about the merits of any patent or trade-
mark case. I'm not about to educate myself in that jungle. I appoint rou-
tinely Special Masters who know what this is all about .... I would have
no confidence in my ability to do any justice in that thicket of patent and
trademark, which I never understood when I was trying to practice law,
and I wouldn't begin to understand it now."
Id.
192 See, e.g., Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.) (bank-
ruptcy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976); Burgess v. Williams, 302 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.
1962) (bankruptcy); Board of Educ. Yonkers City School Dist. v. CNA Ins. Co., 113
F.R.D. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (school desegregation).
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broad remedial relief.1"3 Indeed, it may be thought that these latter
roles for special masters implicate the adjudicatory function much less
than the more general references, and that perhaps the "exceptional
condition" requirement should even be abandoned in these contexts. As
I have indicated already, I do not believe such a course of action would
be wise, although I do believe that as a practical matter, Rule 53(b)'s
restrictions are often not observed for these references.
Other types of experimentation with judicial adjuncts, perhaps not
always in the pure "special master" sense, are also occurring. Several
courts-sometimes relying on the authority to appoint special masters
and at other times resting on their inherent authority-have selected
technical advisors to the court.194 In many cases, of course, the court
has exercised its power under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to appoint
expert witnesses and has acquired information in traditional eviden-
tiary fashion." 5 On occasions when the expert is to act as an "advisor
193 In the discovery context, see, e.g., Trustees of the Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Golden.Nugget, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1538, 1557 (C.D.
Cal. 1988) (discovery and pre-trial proceedings resulting in 50 orders over 18 months
in ERISA case); Corcoran Partners, Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 4506 (N.D.
Ill. June 3, 1988) (master to decide reconsideration motion about a judge's prior opin-
ion on jurisdiction and sanctions); Celpaco, Inc. v. MD Papierfabriken, 686 F. Supp.
983 (D. Conn. 1988) (master to oversee discovery in RICO case). In the remedial
context, see, e.g., Ridgeway v. Montana High School Ass'n, 858 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.
1988) (master to oversee implementation of a settlement agreement); Ramirez v. Ri-
vera-Dueno, 861 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1988) (monitor compliance with court order in
class action on behalf of mentally retarded); William v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1988) (implement prison rights decree). Masters also have taken on roles as, inter alia,
hearing contempt motions, see Johnson v. Kay, 860 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1988); determin-
ing members of class, see Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1988);
helping administer a class action, see Mycka v. Celotex, Civ. No. 87-2633 (D.D.C.
Apr. 28, 1989); and collecting information regarding class plaintiffs with a view toward
recommending relief, see Ayuda v. Meese, 700 F.Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1988), mandamus
denied, In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Other references include
requests for reconsideration regarding filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy claim, see In re
A.H. Robins Co., 869 F.2d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1988); and an appointment to aid the
court in determining foreign law, see Henry v. S.S. Bermuda Star, 863 F.2d 1225,
1227-28 (5th Cir. 1989).
194 See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-61 (1st Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a technical advisor
to assist in calculating damages in a medical malpractice case).
195 Under FED. R. EVlD. 706(a), a court may, sua sponte or in response to a
party's motion, "enter an order to show cause why an expert witness should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations." If the expert makes
findings, the parties should be so advised. The witness's deposition may be taken by
any party, and the witness may be called to testify and be cross-examined at trial. See 3
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 706[021, at 706-21 (1988).
But see Reilly, 863 F.2d at 155-56 (concluding that Rule 706(a) does not restrict
judge's power to appoint technical advisor); CNA Ins. Co., 113 F.R.D. at 654-55 (sua
sponte appointing special master concurrently under FED. R. Civ. P. 53 and FED. R.
EvID. 706).
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to the court," however, Rule 53, inherent authority, or both have been
cited as the source of authority.'96 In Reed v. Cleveland Board of Edu-
cation, 97 the court required the payment of fees to such a technical
advisor (in this case appointed to assist the special master), but cau-
tioned that a court should not, in the absence of agreement by all par-
ties, avail itself of legal advice from one who was neither counsel in the
case nor a witness under oath."98
More recently, in Reilly v. United States, 9' an appellate court
approved the appointment of a technical advisor to the court to assist in
the calculation of damages. Although not resting on the authority of
Rule 53, the court found that complex economic theories relied upon in
regard to the damages issue justified the judge's use of a technical advi-
sor to "'advise and instruct [him] on the myriad and arcane aspects of
economic science necessary to a just adjudication of the . . . case.' "200
In Reilly, the court of appeals did acknowledge that a variety of proce-
dural safeguards-notice to the parties of the identity of the advisor, the
requirement of a "job description" for the advisor, and an affidavit by
the advisor attesting to his compliance with the designated
tasks-should be adopted in the future.2'
The use of technical advisors or "experts," authority for which has
occasionally been linked to Rule 53 master appointments, is another
example of circumvention of formal rules. Here again, procedural re-
quirements-such as those in Federal Rule of Evidence 706-may
technically be inapplicable if the "advisor" does not testify.202 But a
199 See, e.g., Reilly, 863 F.2d at 154 n.4 (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) and Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
197 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979).
198 See id. at 745-48 (decrying the additional expense and ordering that in the
future a rate of compensation should be set in advance so that the parties "are aware of
the actual costs of the reference as they accrue," and noting that "to the extent that [the
district judge] relied on advice received in chambers from a 'legal expert' there was a
partial abdication of his role").
199 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
200 Id. at 158 (quoting Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.R.I.
1988)). The district judge in Reilly further envisioned the economist/advisor as some-
one "in the nature of a law clerk" and someone with whom he could have "freewheel-
ing discussion." Reilly, 682 F. Supp. at 152. The circuit court dismissed the suggestion
that a "technical advisor" should be required to submit a written report. See Reilly, 863
F.2d at 160 n.8.
20I See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 159-60.
202 These protections include advising the parties of any findings, if any are made,
and allowing the parties to depose, call to testify, and cross-examine the expert witness.
Cf. Gary W. v. State of La. Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 861 F.2d 1366,
1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (party could not depose director of special monitoring unit who
had prepared report detailing incidences of abuse and neglect, even though she was not
acting in her capacity as special master when she wrote the report).
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different danger arises; a core adjudication function takes place under
the influence of an outside expert to whom counsel does not even have
access. Academics and other "experts" may be valuable assets upon
which courts may rely. But they should do so under clear
rules-perhaps in particular kinds of cases-with formal procedural
safeguards.
One last case epitomizes my general concern about abdication of
the judicial function to outside actors. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Altech
Industries, Inc., the court permitted a special master to preside over a
jury trial with the consent of the parties.2"' The court acknowledged its
unprecedented path, but believed its actions to be proper. Interestingly,
the case was one in which a special master had been appointed under
Rule 53 originally to supervise discovery because of the particularly
"contentious and cantankerous" behavior of the parties.2"4
Once again, an initial pre-trial delegation of discovery matters to a
special master led to the use of a non-institutional actor in a central
judicial role-here, the conduct of a jury trial. Although as a general
matter private adjudication is to be applauded, the conduct of a jury
trial by a private "judge" is inappropriate. Institutionally accountable
judicial officers-whether they be judges or magistrates-have been
given this role by the Constitution and by statute. The exercise of fed-
203 117 F.R.D. 650 (C.D. Cal. 1987); for other examples of abdication of the
judicial function, see In re Newman, 763 F.2d 407, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that a
special master had been appointed to hear an entire patent case because of the "sub-
stantial and contradictory submissions of record and the complicated issues of scientific
and technical fact"). In In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985), the court
upheld the reference of a summary judgment motion to a special master, but main-
tained that the delegation of an entire trial was improper. In Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.
Supp. 512, 519 (W.D. Mich. 1987), the court deemed plaintiff's motion for sanctions
under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 "a close question" regarding defendant's request that a spe-
cial master conduct the trial.
204 I have noted this self-perpetuating, or "hydraulic," quality to references in
which the original reference to a special master is replaced by more, and often more
expansive, tasks. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31; see also Johnson v. Kay,
860 F.2d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 1988) (master's initial role in settlement replaced by the
role of hearing motions for civil contempt). The impact of this trend was not lost on
the court in Reed, which sympathetically observed that
[tihough the breadth of the special master's assignment appears to have
expanded as the case progressed, this is understandable. It was impossible
to anticipate every problem which would be encountered in fashioning a
remedy. We do not believe that the special master exceeded the bounds of
his appointment or that the defendants were unaware of the expansion of
his duties and responsibilities.
Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743-44 (6th Cir. 1979); see also Rob-
erts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (in RICO case, special master who
monitored discovery prior to class certification took on additional discovery supervision
following class certification).
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eral judicial power and control of the constitutional jury function
should not be subject to the whims of the parties.2 0 5
IV. LESSONs FROM THE JUDICIAL ADJUNCT EXPERIENCE
This paper is not intended as a general critique of the utilization
of judicial adjuncts or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. At
this time of reflecting on where the Federal Rules have taken us and
where they should be going, there are important lessons to be learned
from this case study of judicial adjuncts.
On the micro level, it is fair to say that the role of modern judicial
adjuncts bears little relationship to the special masters envisioned by the
1938 Rules. The historical role of masters was to aid at trial by report-
ing facts and conclusions of law in a technical or complex case or to
assist in the post-trial phase in the calculation of damages or accounts.
The elaborate pre-trial presence that special masters now have and the
broad-ranging powers they now bring to fashioning remedies in litiga-
tion have been brought about by the changing nature of modern
litigation.
The magistrates, too, were introduced through statutory changes
and have replaced the traditional special masters in some respects. In
certain types of litigation-post-conviction relief, social security cases,
and Title VII litigation-cases are referred to magistrates for initial
reports and recommendations. The magistrate is thus not entirely un-
like the traditional master, but has been made a formal judicial officer
with a formal judicial role.
05 I suspect that Judge Richard Posner would also disapprove this type of refer-
ence. In his comments to my paper, he indicates no discomfort with special master
references but substantial difficulty with magistrates when they try cases with the con-
sent of the parties. See Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates
and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216-17 (1989). I interpret Judge Posner's
reaction to be a concern with the type of adjudicatory functions undertaken by judicial
adjuncts. As I indicate in this paper, however, one danger resulting from special master
references has been the tendency to delegate broader adjudication authority, including
the hearing of dispositive motions and, more recently, the conducting of jury trials,
albeit with the consent of the parties. Although as a constitutional matter under Article
III, there may be little difference between consent to a trial by magistrate and consent
to a trial by master, see Silberman, supra note 15, at 1350-53, as a matter of policy,
there are significant concerns. Magistrates are full-time federal judicial officers with
appropriate accountability. Masters are part-time adjuncts to whom we should be wary
of entrusting judicial power. The danger of special relationships and special interests
influencing decision-making is evident, and public confidence in our formal institutions
is likely to be eroded. See Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitu-
tional and Policy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592,
1593 (1981) (arguing that "that advantages of using reference as a full-blown substi-
tute for federal or state court trials are outweighed by the institutional costs, if not
negated entirely by the consitutional concerns").
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As the descriptive portions of this paper reveal, special masters
have been useful at the discovery stage in devising innovative proce-
dures to streamline and expedite cases. Their expertise in particular
substantive fields and their sophistication in management techniques
has been invaluable, particularly in large complex cases. To some de-
gree, the informality and flexibility of their approaches are the very
essence of their success. Similarly, the use of masters in the remedial
stages of litigation have made it possible to implement and effectuate
judicial rulings that would not otherwise be possible.
At the same time, I have suggested potential institutional costs em-
anating from a reflexive tendency to rely heavily on judicial adjuncts.
The pre-trial masters may, in some cases, merely aggrandize the pre-
trial and discovery role. Not only is the use of a master expensive, but
it also may delay the likelihood of focusing on the merits of the case.
To the extent that the pre-trial master shapes the case or influences
settlement, reliance is placed on a private individual without institu-
tional commitment and with potential conflicts of interest. More serious
objections lie in the direct assumption of the judicial role by the master:
making rulings and authoring opinions on preliminary issues that may
carry precedential weight.
It may be that some of my objections to special masters can be
overcome with a revision of Rule 53. After all, the 1938 Rule envi-
sioned very different functions for special masters than those under-
taken today. Calibrating the exceptional condition requirement to the
type of reference that is made might be appropriate if there is consen-
sus that using special masters to undertake discovery is a good idea but
permitting them to rule on dispositive motions is not.206 The role of
consent of the parties-keeping in mind the possibility that there might
not always be true consent-might also be a relevant factor in deter-
mining whether a special master is appropriate and on what matters.207
The standard 'of review should also be adjusted to reflect the kind of
20 For example, Magistrate Brazil proposed that special masters be precluded
from hearing any potentially dispositive issues without the parties' consent. See Brazil,
Referring Discovery Tasks, supra note 17, at 185. Alternatively, a revised rule on spe-
cial masters might permit references for supervision of discovery and for rulings on
non-dispositive discovery matters if neither a judge nor a magistrate is available to
render pre-trial assistance or when the special expertise of the master would be desira-
ble. Such a provision would dispense with the stricter "exceptional condition" require-
ment, but would indicate the preferability of referring issues to a magistrate and the
necessity of demonstrating a need for the expertise of a special master before reference
to a master will be granted.
20' For example, references of dispositive motions might be appropriate if the par-
ties consent. The conduct of a trial or the supervision of a jury trial, however, might
not be appropriate in light of the need for public confidence in adjudication.
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motion practice that contemporary special masters undertake.08 The
issue of appointment of a special master for settlement should be ad-
dressed directly, and rules regarding the master-judge relationship and
communications between them should be put in place.209
Restraints must also be placed on the use of masters at the post-
trial relief stage. Criteria should be developed for those circumstances
in which masters are appropriate and standards should be articulated
to assure that accountability and control remain with the district judge.
The question of who will serve as a special master and the procedures
for selection of a special master should also be implemented. In sum, a
revision of Rule 53, which reflects the different functions of judicial
adjuncts, is necessary to clarify precisely what situations and within
precisely what parameters a special master should function.210
On the macro level, our experience with judicial adjuncts signals a
more basic failure in the general philosophy of federal rulemaking and
procedural reform. The great virtues of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1938 were their generality and their application to all civil
cases.211 The Rules, almost by way of a broad charter to district judges,
adopted minimal pleading rules, introduced broader techniques for pre-
trial discovery, and flexible provisions for multiparty litigation. As indi-
vidual cases demanded more particularized responses, the trans-sub-
stantive approach of the Federal Rules was supplemented by the intro-
duction of local rules and standing orders, broad exercises of discretion
by judges, and increased manifestations of "judicial management."
That the original Advisory Committee's goal had been a movement
away from a common law system of procedure-so that procedure
would not dominate the substantive law 212-is the Rules' ultimate
irony.
Indeed, the trans-substantive premise of the Rules is being eroded
in numerous indirect ways. The Manual for Complex Litigation"' and
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
208 De novo review, such as that afforded to reviews of magistrates' rulings on
dispositive motions, would seem appropriate on references of dispositive matters.
209 Professor Brazil, who has offered his own guidelines for pre-trial use of special
masters as an addition to Rule 16, suggests that communications about the merits of the
action between the judge and master should be in writing. See Brazil, Authority to
Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing Sources and the
Need for a New Federal Rule, supra note 17, at 380.
210 See Proposal of Magistrate Wayne Brazil, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION, supra note 17, at 384-88.
211 For a critique of trans-substantive rulemaking, see Burbank, supra note 1, at
1935-37; Subrin supra note 1, at 2048-51.
212 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 957-60 (1987).
"1 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) 283 (1985).
1989] 2175
2176 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
dures,214 although not in formal rulemaking guise, adopt a set of par-
ticularized procedures and recommendations for certain large and com-
plex cases. The recent ALI study of Complex Litigation similarly
moves in the direction of making formal changes in the structure of this
type of litigation.215 But by and large the erosion of trans-substantive
rules has come via ad hoc informal, customized procedures devised by
judges and, often, their judicial adjuncts to cope with the difficulties
posed by the modern caseload.
Why have the federal rulemakers remained beholden to the ap-
proach of a single set of rules for all cases? And why have they resisted
more precise and formalistic responses to some of the recurring
problems in modern litigation, such as abusive discovery 216 and com-
plex class action litigation? It is true that in 1983, under the tenure of
Judge Walter Mansfield and his reporter, Professor Arthur Miller,
amendments to the Federal Rules provided for judicial impositions of
sanctions for pleading, motion, and discovery abuses as well as an in-
creasing emphasis on judicial management in Rule 16. But like the
general approach of most contemporary judicial reform, the direction is
toward institutional restructuring (that is, introduction of magistrates)
and other organizational techniques (judicial management).
One answer to the question I pose is that institutional and organi-
zational reform is always easier than specific and particularized
rules.21 Indeed, there are probably inherent limitations in trying to
create formal systems of a priori rules for categories of cases. But that
it is a difficult task does not mean it should not be tried.
I have suggested that it is partly due to our continuing delegation
of process to judicial adjuncts that we have failed to make more com-
prehensive procedural reform. Rather than revisit procedures appropri-
ate in elaborate documentary or multi-party cases, a delegation to a
special master, who can devise a customized procedure for the case,
214 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, (1979).
218 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (Tent. Draft
No. 1 Apr. 14, 1989).
218 Articles lamenting the over-development of discovery abound. See, e.g., SEGAL,
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: Ex-
PRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (Fed. Jud. Center 1978);
Batista, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse-the Recent Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from the Bench and Bar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 671 (1983); Katzenbach, Modern Discovery: Remarks from the Defense Bar, 57
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 732 (1983); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse
Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 680 (1983).
217 Cf Seron, The Limitations of Standardizing the Practices of Judges (Mar.
1988), (unpublished paper) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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alleviates the immediate pressure on the judge's calendar. Rather than
confront the policy issue of whether litigation like Agent Orange should
have something other than a judicial forum, there are sighs of relief
that the case was in the hands of Judge Weinstein whose innovations
and management helped bring about settlement of the case. Thus, the
use of judicial adjuncts has pushed formalized procedure into retreat.
Although I have no particular programmatic federal rules agenda
to propose, a change in direction in rulemaking philosophy generally
seems warranted. Among the possibilities are redirecting efforts to spe-
cific reform of the discovery and class action rules. In this respect the
"special master" experience may have provided some accumulated wis-
dom for more generic application. Certain procedures-such as the
statement of contentions and proofs used by several special masters, or
inverted discovery formats where discovery objections are brought to the
masters as a first resort-could be debated and evaluated by the
rulemakers. Even more detailed management rules devised by special
masters, such as limits on interrogatories and limiting depositions to
one day unless otherwise approved, might be applied more
comprehensively.
Even if mattei's such as these are inappropriate for general
rulemaking, one could think about devising a format of rules for appli-
cation in particular kinds of cases. One need not retreat to the system of
common law writs and develop one comprehensive set of rules for anti-
trust cases, another set for multi-tort cases, and another for environ-
mental cases. But the rules could certainly be supplemented in particu-
lar areas, such as pleading and discovery, with specific rules for specific
cases. Whether that supplemental system should be developed for ap-
plication along particular substantive lines or whether such procedures
should merely be designed as a separate track or tracks is debatable.
One example of this "specialized" track comes from the English experi-
ence, which has a separate commercial court with its own procedures
for one class of large cases. Other models are suggested by the Manual
for Complex Litigation, the Report on Antitrust cases, the FJC study
for asbestos cases,2"' and the experimental models of court-annexed
arbitration.
I believe this overview of judicial adjuncts provides a powerful ex-
ample of our need to move away from trans-substantive procedural
rules. As others have already observed, devices such as special masters,
judicial management, local rules, and standing orders have made trans-
substantive rules a concept in name only. Institutionalizing in the form
218 WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Fed. Jud. Center 1987).
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of formal rulemaking those procedures that have proved effective in
much of our ad hoc case management environment will have distilled
the best from that experience.
